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Preface
This dissertation touches upon several ways in which economic behavior in re-
sponse to tax policy is modified by what agents believe and perceive about the
world around them.
The first chapter analyzes the stock market responses to a change in expecta-
tions about future tax rates. Making use of betting markets to measure expecta-
tions regarding a major U.S. tax reform, it finds that the most profitable firms,
and those in more concentrated markets, gained a large majority of the benefits of
the tax reform, which was widely expected to reduce the tax burden of all corpo-
rations. This result assumes particular importance in light of recent results in the
economics literature, which has found that market power has risen substantially
in the U.S. over the past three decades, and that this increase has been driven
by a few firms at the top of the mark-up distribution. My results confirm this
trend in investor expectations, looking forward. The relationship between rents
and corporate tax burden allows me to estimate the distribution of rents across
the U.S. sector, showing that indeed rents are concentrated among a few firms,
which tend to be intensive in their use of intangible capital.
The second chapter, co-authored with Benjamin Glass and published in the
Journal of Public Economic Theory, analyzes how agent welfare is affected by the
misperception of tax rates, generalizing some existing results in the behavioral
public finance literature. We find that in the presence of heterogeneous biases,
measuring the welfare effects of a sales tax is impossible even with full knowledge
of aggregate demand, as a function of both pre-tax prices and the tax rate. While
consumer under-reaction to sales tax tends to harm consumer surplus, as agents
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are unable to defend themselves against higher after-tax prices, it also tends to
mitigate tax burden in excess of revenue raised, as unresponsive agents will gen-
erate more revenue for a given tax rate. Nonetheless, heterogeneity introduces a
channel that exacerbates the excess burden, as different perceived prices introduce
an issue of allocative inefficiency. Our work shows, in a very general setting, that
by maximizing or minimizing this allocative inefficiency one can obtain bounds for
excess burden, computable with aggregate or average parameters of demand.
The third chapter, also co-authored with Benjamin Glass, shows that even
under taxation schemes designed to leave marginal incentives untouched, policy
uncertainty can distort the ex-ante decisions of a firm. In particular, we show
that if a firm’s marginal tax rate is correlated with the success of its ventures, this
might discourage or encourage input use, such as investment. More specifically,
investment will be discouraged if the firm’s marginal tax rate is higher in those
states of the world in which the investment’s marginal revenue product is high;
viceversa, if the marginal revenue product and the marginal tax rate are negatively
correlated, investment will be encouraged. We further investigate this channel in
an empirical model of capital asset pricing, finding significantly different patters
across different industries.
Each chapter is designed to be self-contained, but all inquire the ways in which
perception and belief shape the effects of economic policy. The first chapter mea-
sures how changes in expected tax rates heterogeneously impacted the stock valu-
ation of firms, and uses this to infer conclusions regarding the distribution of rents
throughout the corporate sector. The second chapter studies how the mispercep-
tion of tax rates influences consumer welfare, and how one might measure excess
burden in the presence of these biases. Last but not least, the third chapter is
concerned with a “second moment” of agents’ belief; it shows how the covariance
between two sources of uncertainty, government policy and underlying business
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Abstract
My dissertation studies three cases in which the perception of current policy or
beliefs about future policy shaped economic decisions. Issues of attention and be-
liefs about the future can have tremendous importance both because agent actions
reveal what they believe about the future, such as in the first and third chapters,
or because misperception change how agents are affected by policy, such as in the
second chapter.
The first chapter measures the effect of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act on
share prices of publicly traded firms, finding that the most profitable firms, and
those in concentrated industries, benefited the most. The tax bill significantly
reduced corporate tax rates, thereby increasing share prices, particularly at the
top. Among firms with the highest profit rates, more than 80 percent rose in value
on news of the tax reform, whereas among less profitable firms, fewer than 60
percent appreciated. By every measure, stock market gains coincident with the
tax bill were concentrated among firms with greater market power. This pattern is
consistent with economic rents being important components of the values of large
U.S. corporations.
The second chapter of my dissertation looks at how to measure welfare in a
world where tax policy might be misperceived by agents. Recent developments in
behavioral public economics have shown that heterogeneous biases prevent point
identification of deadweight loss. The second chapter replicates this result for
an arbitrary (closed) consumption set, whereas previous results on heterogeneous
attention focused on binary choice. It finds that one can bound the efficiency costs
of taxation based on aggregate features of demand. When individuals have linear
xv
demand functions, the bounds for deadweight loss are easy to calculate from linear
regressions.
While the first chapter of my dissertation looks at the effects of expected pol-
icy, the third and last chapter looks at higher-order moments. Forecasts of the
consequences of tax changes usually assume that economic actors expect these
changes are permanent, despite the inevitable political uncertainty that could lead
to future reversals or further changes. This reasoning extends to when a firm’s tax
burden is correlated to the success of its ventures. The third chapter shows how a
firm’s belief about how government policy is correlated with the input’s marginal
product distorts its risk profile, leading it to change its input decision. Generally
speaking, input use will be discouraged if the firm faces high taxes precisely when
the input is more productive. The last chapter shows that in a world of policy
uncertainty this holds under an arbitrary tax system, and in particular it holds
even if inputs can be perfectly deducted from the firm’s taxable income. Whenever
the covariance between policy and payoff is zero, the model replicates the classical
result that the deductibility of input expenses leaves the decision undistorted. The
third chapter uses this theoretical relationship in an empirical model of asset pric-
ing to infer what investors believe about how future government policy correlates
with their risky investments in different firms in the stock market.
Each chapter’s analysis can be read on its own, but the unifying theme is that
in each case issues of perception and belief were central in either identifying current
beliefs about the world, or in understanding the real impact of economic policy on
agent welfare.
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Chapter 1. Tax Reform and the
Valuation of Superstar Firms
1.1. Introduction
The last few decades have seen the rise of innovative firms that have managed to
quickly gain large market shares in their respective sectors. Some of these com-
panies have joined the ranks of the firms with the largest market capitalizations,
sparking public debate regarding their ability to control such large portions of
their respective markets. Recent academic literature corroborates some of these
concerns. De Loecker and Eeckhout [2017] and De Loecker et al. [2018] have doc-
umented a sharp increase in mark-ups over marginal cost since 1980, arguing that
this has been driven by a rise in the market power of a few firms at the top of
the mark-up distribution. Autor et al. [2017] and Dorn et al. [2017] use a similar
methodology to argue that this increase in mark-ups is tied to the secular decline
in labor’s share of GDP.
this chapter studies how much market power matters for the valuation of the
U.S. corporate sector, by investigating how news regarding a corporate tax cut in
the U.S. affected the excess returns of U.S. corporations. The effect of a tax cut
on the excess returns of a company depends on who bears the burden of corporate
taxes. If shareholders bear all of the burden, firm values will simply increase lin-
early with the cut in tax rates. If, on the other hand, the burden can be entirely
shifted away, such as to workers in the form of lower wages or consumers in the
form of higher prices, then news of the tax cut will not affect firm valuations.
Firms with market power will bear more of the corporate tax burden, because
1
they bear the entirety of the burden of taxes that fall on pure economic profits, or
rents.
The empirical analysis consists of two main parts, both of which look at the
effects the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA). Signed into law on December 22, 2017,
the reform reduced corporate income tax rates in the U.S. from a top rate of 35%
to a flat rate of 21%. In order to identify news of the tax bill, the paper relies on
relevant dates for the passing of the TCJA, identified in other literature through
Google trends data and common knowledge of the history of the bill. Further,
data from online bets on corporate tax reform in the U.S. allow me to quantify
the news on each date and develop clear interpretations for my estimates.
The first part of the analysis exploits variation across firms and, controlling for
other characteristics that might have influenced heterogeneity in the effect of the
tax bill, such as exposure to provisions on foreign operations, it shows that firms
with higher accounting profit margins and bigger market shares tended to earn
higher returns upon news of the TCJA. The second part exploits variation within
each company across time, and looks at the resulting distribution of individual
effects of news of the tax bill in its entirety.
The first exercise shows strong relations between excess returns due to news
of the tax cut and measures of profitability and market power. The results show
that firms with high shares in more concentrated industries and firms with bigger
profit margins gained significantly more from the reduction in corporate tax rates.
If market shares and profit margins reflected purely differences in productivity,
rather than differences in the potential entry faced by firms, then we would expect
to see no relation between the two. Instead, the results suggest that at least some
variation derives from real rents that cannot be competed away by potential entry,
either in the short run or in the long run.
These results are important for two reasons. First, they are important for pol-
icy reasons, as they reveal that differences in market power may be an important
source of variation in the burden of corporate taxation faced by the owners of
2
different firms, and that they may be taxed without much distortion. Second, the
results put emphasis on the notion put forth by De Loecker et al. [2018] that mar-
ket power might play a significant role in the market valuation of some companies.
Quantifying the news on each of the dates considered as relevant for news of
the TCJA reveals highly heterogeneous effects across different dates, which implies
news on the dates of interest represent more than simple changes in the probability
of a corporate tax cut. Given this argument the last date considered, in which the
bill received final congressional ratification for signature by the president, repre-
sents the cleanest identification of how an increase in the probability of a tax cut
affected firm values. According to this interpretation, the results suggest a one
standard deviation change in a firm’s accounting profit margin is associated with
an increase in returns of 29.9 percentage points, and that going from perfect com-
petition to a position of monopoly increases the excess return a company obtains
due to the tax rate change by 87.7 percentage points.
The second part of the analysis shows that the benefits of the tax bill were
highly concentrated among a few firms at the top. This is especially interesting
in light of the first set of results, because the firm-level effect of the bill offers an
alternative measure of a firm’s market power. The distribution of gains from the
bill is concentrated around zero but exhibits a long right tail. Quantifying the
results with betting data reveals a strong concentration of gains from the TCJA.
The top 1% of beneficiaries from the tax bill represented 22% of the original mar-
ket value of all publicly traded firms but earned 50% of the total gains from the
TCJA; the top 5% represented 45% of the original market value but earned 88%
of the gains; the top 10% represented 53% of the original value and earned more
than the totality of the gains, which were negative for about a quarter of firms in
the sample.
While these results should be interpreted with caution, they are important be-
cause they provide a forward-looking confirmation of the historical trends detected
by Autor et al. [2017] and De Loecker and Eeckhout [2017]. It is also reassuring
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for this strain of literature, which often relies on structural assumptions for identi-
fication, that the ranking of firms in my sample largely matches our prior: Google,
Apple, Walmart, Disney, and Microsoft all feature as some of the biggest benefi-
ciaries of the bill. Further, my results provide a picture of the distribution of the
heterogeneous burden of corporate taxation across different firms.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the literature
on corporate tax incidence and gives some background on the present state of the
literature, contextualizing the contribution of this chapter. Section 3.3 lays out a
simple framework to think about the excess returns earned by a firm upon a cut
in the corporate tax rate. Section 1.4 describes the data and gives some institu-
tional background. Section 1.5 describes the methodology and the results of the
empirical analysis. Section 3.5 concludes.
1.2. Background
The modern study of corporate tax incidence began with the Harberger [1962]
model, in which the incidence of the corporate tax depends on the intersectoral
reallocation of capital. Dividing the economy into a corporate and a non-corporate
sector, he points out that higher corporate tax rates will increase the cost of cor-
porate capital. If capital is free to move between the two sectors, this will reduce
the return to capital economy-wide, and so all owners of capital, not just corporate
capital, bear the burden of the tax. Depending on the relative intensity in each
sector, other factors may bear some or all of the burden, too, as corporate capital is
moved to the non-corporate sector. Subsequent work such as Summers [1981] has
noted that if there are frictions that prevent capital from reallocating immediately
between sectors, then incidence might be higher for corporate shareholders. On
the other hand, Gordon and Hines [2002] noted that if capital is perfectly mobile
across borders, corporate tax changes in one country cannot affect the after-tax
return to capital, and thus the entirety of the burden falls on fixed factors of pro-
duction, most notably labor and land.
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Issues of imperfect competition also complicate the incidence of corporate taxes,
and are of primary importance to this chapter. Any rate of return earned by cor-
porate capital on top of the risk-adjusted rate of return is a rent, and taxes on
corporate rents are generally entirely borne by shareholders.1 The simplest exam-
ple of this is a tax on a monopolist’s profits: because the monopolist maximizes
pre-tax profits, regardless of the tax rate, its behavior will not be distorted and
shareholders will bear the entire burden of the tax.
One notable exception from the simple monopoly reasoning is that corporate
rents can arise as returns on intangible capital held by firms. In this case, the
corporate tax can be seen as a tax on entrepreneurial effort, and its incidence will
depend on how it affects the process of creation of new ideas. As Auerbach [2006]
vividly puts in his review of the literature on corporate tax incidence, “the garages
of Silicon Valley might have been used to store cars if the corporate tax rate had
been higher.” To the degree that the creation of new ideas is not influenced by the
corporate tax, a tax on corporate rents will still fall mainly on corporate sharehold-
ers. While gathering conclusive evidence on this matter is far from trivial, Akcigit
et al. [2018] find evidence suggesting that taxes do matter for innovation, or at
least for its distribution across U.S. states. My results suggest that big tech firms
did not face a sharp increase in competition due to the reduction of the corporate
tax rate – at least not in the short run.
A second issue is that the corporate tax might affect the equilibrium of a dy-
namic game of imperfect competition. Davidson and Martin [1985] note that a
corporate tax increase might affect companies’ ability to punish each other in the
event of a deviation from collusive behavior, which would also make it distor-
tionary. Furthermore, if the tax base does not coincide with pure rents, imperfect
competition might worsen the welfare effects of taxation and can lead to tax over-
shifting, whereby a tax induces prices to increase more than one-for-one. Fullerton
and Metcalf [2002] review the literature on tax incidence and derive the conditions
1See, for instance, the discussion in Auerbach [2006].
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under which over-shifting would be induced by an excise or an ad-valorem tax.
Empirical work on corporate tax incidence tends to conclude that at least some
of the corporate tax burden is shared by factors of production other than corpo-
rate capital. Much of this work is focused on assessing the impact of corporate
tax on wages. Analyzing union wage premiums, Felix and Hines [2009] find that
workers in unionized firms capture slightly over half of the benefits of low tax
rates. Arulampalam et al. [2012]’s analysis of wages and corporate taxes in Eu-
rope agrees with this finding, suggesting that about half of the burden of corporate
taxes falls on labor. Looking at cross-industry differences in corporate tax rates
in the U.S., Liu and Altshuler [2013] find that the elasticity of wages with respect
to the corporate marginal effective tax rate is higher in more concentrated indus-
tries, a fact seemingly at odds with the findings of this chapter, which suggest
that greater concentration is tied to larger excess returns due to the tax cut. But
as noted by Auerbach [2006], situations of imperfect competition, where market
outcomes are already distorted by the desire of companies to artificially limit out-
put, might exacerbate the distortions of the corporate tax. More recent studies
of corporate tax incidence have focused on sub-national variation in corporate tax
rates. Suárez Serrato and Zidar [2016] use variation in corporate tax rates across
U.S. states to estimate a model with imperfect labor and firm mobility. They find
that firm owners bear about 40% of corporate taxes, workers bear 30-35%, and
landowners 25-30%. Fuest et al. [2018] use variation across German municipalities,
finding that workers bear roughly one half of the corporate tax burden.
The most recent U.S. tax reform has spurred a new wave of empirical studies
on the effects of corporate tax policy. While arguably the most salient feature of
the TCJA for corporations was a reduction in corporate tax rates, it contained
a variety of provisions which are reflected in the breadth of the studies on the
topic. Wagner et al. [2018b], for instance, document that the stock prices of
internationally-oriented firms suffered from news of the TCJA, and that the ag-
gregate market responded positively to lower expected taxes. Blanchard et al.
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[2018] find that increases in expected dividends – in which the corporate tax cut
played a significant role – were largely responsible for the increase in stock value
over the year following the election of President Trump. Gaertner et al. [forthcom-
ing] study the effects on foreign companies, finding that Chinese firms, especially
in steel manufacturing, experienced large negative returns, while the rest of the
world experienced positive returns. Wagner et al. [2018a] analyze the effects of
Trump’s election on the U.S. stock market, finding that expected tax rates greatly
impact firm value. Hanlon et al. [2018] look at the actions and statements about
actions of companies in the aftermath of the TCJA, finding, among other things,
that share buybacks generally increased in the aftermath of the TCJA, but that
this increase was concentrated in a small number of firms.
this chapter stands out from existing literature in its focus on the relation be-
tween the excess return earned due to news of the TCJA and traditional measures
of profitability and market power. While in much of the paper I will be speaking
about the effects of a tax cut, my empirical analysis measures the effects of news
regarding a possible future tax cut. The late 1980’s and the 1990’s saw a spur of
interest in questions regarding belief about future policy. Auerbach and Kotlikoff
[1987], Auerbach and Hines [1988], Cutler [1988], Poterba [1989], Rodrik [1991],
and Slemrod and Greimel [1999] are all concerned with how changes in expecta-
tions regarding future tax policy affect current decision making, both by firms and
individuals, both in financial markets and in the real economy. Cutler [1988]’s
analysis of the 1986 Tax Reform Act’s (TRA86) effect on stock market prices pro-
vides an analysis that parallels this chapter. Among other things, Cutler points
out the effect of tax reform on firm value is ambiguous, a reality that in his case
was further aggravated by the fact that TRA86 drew a distinction between old and
new capital via the Investment Tax Credit. this chapter builds on his framework
by using techniques more in line with the modern literature in empirical finance.
A related literature has studied the effects of policy beliefs more generally and
in a variety of fields of economics. Friedman [2009], who used news on regulations
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of drug coverage to estimate the incidence of Medicare Part D, is a methodological
predecessor to this chapter: on top of taking an out-right event-study approach,
I use a more continuous approach that allows me to do something closer in spirit
to a difference-in-difference estimation. Some of this literature has made use of
betting data to make sense of magnitudes, such as Meng [2017], who has used
prediction market data regarding the passing of an anti-pollution cap-and-trade
bill to estimate the marginal abatement cost of proposed policy, or Graziano et al.
[2018], who studied the consequences of expectations about the U.K.’s exit from
the European Union.
The great potential applications for prediction market data, which this chap-
ter makes use of, have been advocated for some time in the literature, starting
with papers like Arrow et al. [2008]. Some early applications include Slemrod
and Greimel [1999], who studied how the probability of Steve Forbes winning the
presidency influenced the returns for municipal bonds, Wolfers [2006], who studied
point-shaving in NCAA basketball, or Snowberg et al. [2011], who advocated the
use of betting data in event studies. While some authors, such as Manski [2006],
have cast some doubt on the use of these data, arguing that there is no theoretical
guarantee that betting odds will reflect average or even median beliefs, Wolfers
and Zitzewitz [2006] offer some theoretical justification as well as some empirical
evidence in support of interpreting betting prices as average beliefs.
1.3. A Simple Model of Corporate Tax
Incidence
This section lays out a simple theoretical model of excess returns, and relates it to
the discussion of corporate rents. It then connects the predictions of the theoretical
framework to the methodology used in the empirical analysis. As discussed in
section 1.2, the effect of a corporate tax cut on the excess returns of a company’s
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equity depends crucially on the degree to which shareholders bear the burden of
the tax. The analysis assumes that firms are entirely financed by equity,2 and
considers what happens to the value of this equity starting at a certain corporate
tax rate, τ ∈ (0, 1).
Firm i’s discounted sum of future after-tax profits, V̄i = V̄i(τ), is determined
by two distinct components, Vi1 = Vi1(τ) and Vi2 = Vi2(τ):
V̄i = Vi1 + Vi2.
Vi1 represents profits from operations where tax burden can be shifted to other
entities, such as workers, consumers, or owners of non-corporate capital, while
Vi2 represents profits from operations whose pre-tax value is not influenced by
variation in τ , as would be true for pure economic profits. Letting Πi1(τ) and Πi2
represent the present discounted value of quasi-rents from each kind of operation,
we will have:
Vi1(τ) = (1− τ)Πi1(τ)
Vi2(τ) = (1− τ)Πi2. (1.1)
Appendix A.1 provides an example where firm value can be broken down in two
parts with the same properties as in equation 1.1. When the entry of new com-
petitors is impossible, the full burden of the corporate tax falls on firm owners;
when entry is costly but possible, firms will bear less than the full burden.
Consider a marginal increase in the tax rate. Since the tax burden imposed
on Vi2(τ) falls entirely on equity holders, a marginal tax increase will be entirely
reflected in value: dVi2/dτ = −Πi2. The same does not hold for Vi1, which will
change only to the degree that any of the tax burden imposed on this part of
2While this assumption significantly simplifies exposition, note that little would be different
if firms do not change their ratio of equity to debt financing, which will be true for a marginal
tax change if firms were choosing their financing ratios optimally before the change. Although
certainly the change in corporate tax rate induced by the TCJA was not marginal, this might
alleviate concerns that results are heavily influenced by financing considerations.
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profits actually falls on the firm:
dVi1
dτ




In the case of a tax cut, dΠi1(τ)/dτ will be determined by the speed with which
new firms can enter the market and compete with incumbents. On one extreme,
if entry takes an infinitely long time, then the company’s pre-tax profits decrease




On the other extreme, if entry is immediate and the increase in after-tax profits







Assuming that dΠi1(τ)/dτ can only vary between these two extremes allows us to
express it as a convex combination of the two. For some αi ∈ [0, 1]:
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Therefore, one can think of αi as the fraction of the burden on Vi1 that is not
borne by firm i.
Given these two pieces, the excess returns that the firm earns upon a marginal
















This expression reveals two important implications. First, the lower αi the more
tax burden falls on shareholders, and so excess returns on the firm’s equity upon
news of the tax cut are decreasing in αi. Second, the higher the ratio of rents to
other profits Πi2/Πi1 the more important rents are in determining firm value, so
higher values of Πi2/Πi1 will result in a bigger excess returns upon a tax cut.
The empirical work that follows studies how excess returns due to news about
the TCJA correlate with several measures of a firm’s profitability and market
power. More specifically, the analysis focuses on (i) market capitalization, which is
a measure of firm size, (ii) the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, computed as the sum of
squared shares in an industry and traditionally used as a measure of market power,
interacted with own market share and (iii) the Lerner index, a firm’s accounting
profit margin, computed as the ratio of operating profits minus depreciation over
revenues.
Observing a positive relation between one of these measures and excess returns
could mean 1) that those firms with higher measures of market power earn high
rents, meaning that they have a high Vi2/Vi1, or 2) that they tend to have a low αi,
which could be due to high adjustment costs of transferring capital in and out of
the firm or frictions that prevent the entry of new firms or the exit of incumbents.
In either case, the firm’s profits are more insulated from new competition upon a
reduction in the tax rate. In the limit as the time for competition to enter goes to
infinity, the two interpretations coincide.
1.4. Data
Some data for this study come from a merge between the Center for Research
in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat, including data on the daily holding
returns of various stocks in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the com-
panies to which they are tied. The study focuses on the period starting after the
2016 presidential election, on November 9, 2016, and ending on the day in which
the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act was signed into law, on December 22, 2017, using both
11
firm accounting data on items such as foreign profits or revenue and financial data
such as holding returns and market value. Summary statistics for the relevant
variables can be found in the Table A.2 in the Appendix.
Additional data include information on news regarding legislative prospects of
the tax bill. this chapter uses six dates identified by Gaertner et al. [forthcoming]
as particularly relevant for the development of tax reform in 2017.3 They docu-
ment spikes in Google searches regarding “tax reform”, depicted in Figure 1.1, on
these dates, and argue that this is due to the fact that these were surprising events
at the time, which attracted the public’s attention on the tax bill. In their paper,
they also use these dates to perform event studies on the stock returns of foreign
companies.
In addition to these dates, the paper uses data from a bet undertaken on the
web platform PredictIt.org, which organizes bets among users around the world.
Betting on PredictIt is entirely user-based; any registered individual can post a
“Buy” or a “Sell” contract for each possible outcome, which in the case of our bets
of interest is always binary (“Yes” or “No”). Contracts pay out nothing to losing
users, and $1 to winning users, and the price is simply the share of that dollar
paid in by each of two users taking part in the bet. No user can wager more than
a total of $850 on a single bet, and PredictIt makes money by charging a 10%
fee for all winnings in excess of money invested, plus a 5% withdrawal fee. As a
result, users will want to buy “Yes” contracts that have a price (adjusted for fees)
lower than their subjective probability of a “Yes”, and sell contracts with a price
higher.
As Graziano et al. [2018] point out, one need not interpret these implied
probabilities as the true, homogeneous belief of all agents in the economy, or even
as the true average belief in the economy, as long as one is willing to suppose that
the price of these contracts is strongly correlated with individual beliefs, and as
3These dates are: September 27, 2017 (United Framework for Tax Reform unveiled - Member
retreat), November 2, 2017 (TCJA introduced in the House), November 16, 2017 (House passes
TCJA), December 2, 2017 (Senate passes TCJA), December 15, 2017 (Bill reported by the joint
conference committee), December 20, 2017 (Final version agreed to by the Senate).
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Figure (1.1) Google trends data for searches regarding “tax reform”. Source: Gaertner et al.
[forthcoming].
long as agents do not systematically change belief in direction opposite to that of
the change in odds.4 this chapter uses changes in betting contract prices to proxy
how financial markets react to shocks to policy expectations.
Other literature on the TCJA, such as in Blanchard et al. [2018], has used a
PredictIt betting series that started the day after the 2016 presidential election,
November 9, 2017, and asked whether there would be a cut in the corporate tax
rate by December 31, 2017. Gaertner et al. [forthcoming] point out that the biggest
in this series spikes do not seem to match up with either the Google trends data
they use nor with conventional wisdom about the developments of the tax bill.
This might be driven by the fact that, except for the last few months of the bet,
this specific betting market was not very thick, and certainly not as thick as for
other bets on the same website,5 so a few outliers could disproportionately move
the price on any given day. Figure 1.2 shows the contract price series overlaid by
the salient events described in Figure 1.1. The series declines until late 2017 when
legislative framework is unveiled and the bill begins to move through Congress.
Not all events match up with the changes as one would expect, and that the largest
spike in the price occurs on August 9, 2017, which does not seem to match up with
4This could technically happen, for instance, if agents with radically different priors inter-
preted the same signals in systematically opposite ways.
5E.g., betting odds on the election of Donald Trump are more widely used and acknowledged
as a good proxy for the public’s beliefs
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Figure (1.2) Average price for a “Buy Yes” contract in the bet “Will there be a corporate tax
cut by December 31, 2017?”. Each red line represents one of the events identified by Gaertner
et al. [forthcoming] using Google Trends data.
any event of note. A simple explanation for this random spike is that a) limits on
the amount that each user can wager on a single bet mean that some mispricing
might not get arbitraged away, and b) this is particularly true on days when very
few people are betting; it is not surprising to find out that on August 9, 2017, only
two users were exchanging contracts on this bet.
Another issue with this particular series of futures prices is that it asked
users to bet on whether there would be a cut in the top corporate tax rate by
December 31, 2017, not necessarily whether one was going to happen imminently
or eventually. This can be an issue that is strongly reflected in the betting odds on
some days at the very end of the series, as right before passing the law there were
some tensions between President Trump and the Republican-controlled Congress
regarding funding for immigration control, and for a moment it seemed possible
that the signing of the tax bill would have to be postponed to the new year. On
December 20, 2017, for example, which is the last date identified by Gaertner et al.
[forthcoming] using Google trends data, and only two days before the final signing
of the bill into law, the probability that the bill is not signed into law, according
to this bet, jumps down by almost 48.4 percentage points, which clearly reflects
the possibility that there would be a corporate tax cut by year-end 2017, not the
possibility that there would be a tax cut at all.
I analyze a new bet started by PredictIt on October 23, 2017, which asked
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whether there would be a corporate tax cut by March 31, 2018. One drawback
of using these data as opposed to the older bet is that it has lower total volume,
as the longer-running bet was likely more salient to users: the average number of
contracts exchanged in the older bet on any day is 2245.7, but only 893.3 in the
newer one; the average number of users exchanging contracts is 52 in the older
one, but only 21 in the newer one. Another issue is that because the bet starts
on October 23, this leaves out the first of the dates identified by Gaertner et al.
[forthcoming], September 27, 2017. However, the new bet is not plagued by timing
issues that would be irrelevant to this analysis, and the betting volume is more
spread out over the lifetime of the bet (see appendix A.2). This could be due to
the fact that this bet was running over a period in which tax legislation was fairly
uniformly relevant in the news. Furthermore, the price of the futures contract lines
up better with the dates used by Gaertner et al. [forthcoming], as we can see in
Figure 1.3. The empirical analysis uses these betting odds as its main point of
reference.
Figure (1.3) Average price for a “Buy Yes” contract in the bet “Will there be a corporate tax
cut by March 31, 2018?”. Each red line represents one of the events identified by Gaertner et al.
[forthcoming] using Google Trends data.
1.4.1. Institutional Background
While tax reform had long been a campaign issue for Donald Trump, the first year
of his presidency was spent mostly focusing on health reform. When these efforts
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stalled in the summer, Congressional Republicans decided to make tax reform their
flagship issue for the coming fiscal year,6 by tying it to the budget reconciliation
process under H.Con.Res71, Title II. After that, as Wagner et al. [2018b] point
out, the process moved swiftly, making the setting ideal for an event study.
The final version of the bill contained numerous provisions regarding the taxa-
tion of both individuals and firms. In particular, it contained a cut in the corporate
tax rate, which went from a top rate of 35% to a flat rate of 21%. This was a
slightly higher final rate than previous proposals, which were at 15% according to
Trump’s plan released in April 2017, and at 20% according to the House Republi-
can plan of June 2016. The TCJA also allowed for immediate expensing of capital
expenditures.
The TCJA also contained major changes to the taxation of multinational en-
tities, shifting the U.S. from a worldwide to a territorial tax system, by allowing
businesses to deduct completely dividends received by 10%-owned foreign corpo-
rations. However, it also introduced measures to curtail shifting profits to low-tax
jurisdictions with minimum tax schemes such as GILTI (Global Intangible Low-
Taxed Income) on intangible assets and BEAT (Base-Erosion and Anti-Abuse Tax)
on income from low-tax jurisdictions, as well as measures to encourage U.S. based
intangible property, such as FDII (Foreign Derived Intangible Income), a reduced
tax rate for income generated abroad attributable to intangible property held do-
mestically. The bill also included a one-time repatriation tax on all foreign-held
income, which went from 12% in the first version considered by the House Ways
and Means Committee on November 2, to 15.5% in the final version of the bill.
Finally, the TCJA also included various changes to the taxation of non-corporate
business income, which might have affected competitors of corporations in the mar-
kets in which they operate. In particular, it allowed for a deduction of up to 20%
of Qualified Business Income from a firm’s tax liability. This deduction is limited
6See, for instance, here for Sen. Pat Toomy’s call to“focus on taxes right now” after the last
Republican attempt to reform health care.
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based on whether a business is designated as a personal service firm7 and on a
person’s total income.
1.5. Empirical Analysis
1.5.1. Controlling for Market Forces
Analyzing raw stock market returns could conflate the effects of interest with other
factors that happen to coincide with them. This issue is particularly relevant if one
is trying to infer aspects of the heterogeneity of the effect across firms. Controlling
for market forces, while necessary to construct a counterfactual, could distort the
overall magnitude of the effect of the tax bill. Suppose for instance each firm’s
expected excess return is equal to a constant times the market excess return. If
the TCJA affected the return on the market portfolio, then we might mistake
movements in a firm’s return due to changes in the market return with movement
due to changes in the corporate tax expectations. This is the reason why Gaertner
et al. [forthcoming] use raw returns rather than basing their analysis on an asset
pricing model.
this chapter opts instead to use “abnormal returns” as the dependent variable,8
rather than raw returns in excess of the risk-free rate, in order to control for
change in these risk factors. Appendix A.4 shows that the sign of the results
is mostly unchanged when using raw excess returns or alternative asset pricing
models, although with larger standard errors. 9
In order to take financial market forces into account, the analysis begins by
estimating a model of stock market returns in the spirit of Fama and French
7This would be the case, e.g., for a doctor’s office or a law firm.
8This is akin, for example, to the approach adopted by Wagner et al. [2018b] in a very similar
setting regarding the TCJA.
9Specifically, the results for market capitalization, which are the weakest among the main
results, sometimes change sign. The results for Herfindahl-Hirschman index have the same sign
but are not significant under other asset pricing models. The results for the Lerner index have
the same sign and magnitude under all specifications, but lose significance under the 5-factor
Fama-French model.
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[1993] on a period preceding the election of President Trump, to get a sense of
how each company’s stock moves with the rest of the financial market. In their
three-factor model the stock market returns of company i = 1, . . . , N in day t =
1, . . . , T , Ri,t, depends on the risk-free rate of return, R
f
t , the returns to a market
portfolio, Rmt , the persistent effects of book-to-market equity, a High-Minus-Low
portfolio (HMLt), and the persistent effects of firm size as measured by its market
capitalization, a Small-Minus-Big portfolio (SMBt):
10
Ri,t −Rft = βmi (Rmt −R
f
t ) + β
HML
i HMLt + β
SMB
i SMBt + ui,t.
Assuming that the β’s in this model do not change between the pre-period consider





can be used to construct expected returns during our sample period of interest,
namely the months leading up to the passing of the TCJA. I will use these expected
returns to construct “abnormal returns” for each company in every period, ARi,t:
ARi,t ≡ (Ri,t −Rft )− β̂mi (Rmt −R
f
t )− β̂HMLi HMLt − β̂SMBi SMBt.
Having abnormal returns for every company in the sample, the paper pro-
ceeds to study how news shocks regarding the tax bill affected returns relative to
what we would have expected. More specifically, in the spirit of the model laid
out in section 3.3, the plan is to study whether firms that might be deemed more
profitable ex-ante also saw the biggest increase in returns upon news of the tax cut.
10These last three values, Rmt , HMLt, and SMBt, are taken directly from Kenneth French’s
website.
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1.5.2. Relation to Measures of Profitability and Market
Power
As section 3.3 discusses, we should observe excess returns to be higher for firms
that do not face potential rent-eroding entry, or that face entry only in longer
periods of time. This section uses a continuous differences-in-differences setting to
study the relationship between the excess returns upon news of the tax bill and
several aspects of firms. The main specification of interest is of the sort:
ARi,t = β0 + β1Mi + β2Mi × TCJADatest + ζt + ξI(i) + γ′Xi,t + εi,t, (1.3)
where TCJADatest is a dummy equal to one if day t is one of the six dates identi-
fied by Gaertner et al. [forthcoming];11 ζt are a set of time fixed-effects; ξI are a set
of industry fixed effects;12 and Xi,t is a vector of controls, including what fraction
of a company’s profits came from abroad in previous years, and the average tax
rate that they face abroad (both are assumed to be zero if a firm only operates
domestically). This is quite important because the TCJA changed many provi-
sions regarding the treatment of corporations’ foreign income, which likely affected
future profits differently depending on how much profit a company was earning
abroad, and depending on the locations of these operations, including the tax rates
faced therein. As a result, the vector of controls includes the interaction between
these two variables and TCJADatest. Mi is a measure of firm i’s size, profitability,
and market power; I explore three different measures: the firm’s market capital-
ization, the firm’s market share interacted with the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
11While this procedure weighs each date equally, further analysis in section 1.5.3 will decompose
the effect of each date.
12Industry here is defined as the first three digits of a company’s NAICS code.
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(henceforth, HHI) of its industry,13 and the firm’s Lerner Index.14 All of these, as
well as controls regarding foreign income, are measured at the end of fiscal year
2016 to minimize the possibility that firms might have adjusted their behavior in
anticipation of the tax reform.
The resulting estimate of β2 will indicate how firms with a larger measure Mi
were differently impacted by the news of the tax bill, by measuring how their stock
market returns differed, on average, during our six dates of interest. If the ability
to exclude competitors, in the short run or in the long run, mattered for the dis-
tribution of excess returns across companies, and if indeed this ability is reflected
in Mi, this should result in positive estimates of β2.
The first version of specification 1.3 uses market capitalization as a measure
of size, and looks at different segments of companies quoted on the NYSE. Re-
sults are reported in Table 1.1. The coefficient on Market Cap ×TCJA dates is
negative for firms at the bottom of the distribution of market capitalization, but
becomes positive and significant for firms in the top quartile and decile of the
distribution. The coefficient is even bigger for firms in the top 1%, though not
statistically significant – an unsurprising result, perhaps, given how much sample
size was reduced. Further, market capitalization is likely to be a noisy measure of
size, especially since it is being measured a year in advance of the periods we are
considering to avoid possible anticipatory effects.
While size is generally not very strongly correlated with excess returns upon
news of the tax cut, this might be expected. As Appendix A.1 points out, differ-
ences in size can be explained by differences in entry costs even in the case where
firms face free and immediate entry, and thus bear none of the burden of the
corporate tax. Measures of profitability and market power exhibit much stronger
13Based on Compustat sales data and 3-digit NAICS sectors. Unfortunately, using Compustat
sales data excludes a number of potential competitors who do not file 10-K’s and thus do not
appear on Compustat. Appendix A.6 shows that results obtained here with Compustat data
can be replicated qualitatively using concentration data from the U.S. Census, which are only
available for the manufacturing sector.
14The Lerner index is also built from Compustat data following established literature, as the







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































HHI× market share 0.226
(0.206)




Lerner index ×TCJA dates 0.000286∗∗
(8.05e-11)
Proportion of foreign profits -0.00143∗ -0.00166∗∗
(0.000818) (0.000815)
Proportion of foreign profits ×TCJA dates -0.00604 -0.00558
(0.00588) (0.00575)
Avg. for. tax rate -0.00119 -0.00129
(0.00162) (0.00161)
Avg. for. tax rate ×TCJA dates 0.0155 0.0175
(0.0133) (0.0127)
N 1,274,778 1,166,039
Industry FE Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table (1.2) Continuous diff-in-diff regressions of abnormal returns. Standard errors, in paren-
theses, are clustered by day.
statistical relations. As we can see in Table 1.2, market share and market con-
centration, as well as the accounting profit margin measured by the Lerner index,
increase how a company’s return increased in response to news of the tax bill.
These results are consistent with the explanation that differences in market power
have been a significant factor in explaining the cross-firm heterogeneity in excess
returns due to news of the tax bill.
In order for these results to be interpreted as a valid differences in differences
design, one should check that there are no significantly different pre-trends be-
tween groups with different degrees of treatment. This test is complicated in this
case by the fact that differences in Mi can only pick up variation in the intensity
of treatment, but there is no group of firms that was not affected by the tax bill,
which leaves us without a true control group. Naturally, since we are analyzing
stock market returns, any theory which predicts excess returns to follow a random
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walk would have to satisfy the no pre-trends assumption. Nonetheless, Appendix
A.5.1 provides some empirical robustness checks for this assumption, showing that
in the months leading up to the passing of the TCJA, the interaction between each
date and each measure of Mi tracks changes in betting market odds.
Even though the main results of interest in Table 1.2 are statistically signifi-
cant, even after clustering standard errors by day, the magnitudes seem surprisingly
small. Column (1) implies that compared to being in perfect competition (that
is, si ≈ 0 and HHII ≈ 0), being a monopolist in one’s sector only raises the gain
from the tax bill by less than 0.9 percentage points. Column (2) implies that a
one standard deviation increase in a firm’s Lerner index is associated with a 0.7
increase in excess returns. These number represent a fraction of the standard de-
viation in excess returns, which is around 3.5 percentage points in the sample. It
should be noted, however, that these results are averaging out across six different
dates, throughout a time when the tax bill was undergoing major changes, and
which did not necessarily reflect the entire effect of the tax bill. In order to better
quantify the effect of news on each date, the next section makes use of betting data.
1.5.3. Cardinal Interpretations
The existence of betting markets specifically on the corporate tax reform quantify
the news shocks used in the study, which in turn can yield a better quantitative
interpretation of the results. As section 1.2 points out, what the empirical work
is trying to measure is not really the reaction of a firm’s value to a change in tax
rate, but rather the reaction to a change in expectations about future tax rates.
Suppose that with probability P , the tax rate is decreased by a marginal amount,
and that otherwise it remains the same. Taking a weighted average of excess return
as defined in equation 1.2, we obtain:









Table (1.3) Change in average price of the bet “Will there be a corporate tax cut by March
31, 2018?” on each of the dates identified by Gaertner et al. [forthcoming]. Note that betting
started on October 23, so there is no data in this series for September 27. The same date on the
bet asking “Will there be a corporate tax cut by December 31, 2017?” yields a ∆P of 0.0397.
December 2, 2017, the date on which the Senate passed the TCJA, was a Saturday. As a result, I
effectively look at returns on the following Monday, December 4, 2017. The change in probability
reported here is the sum of the changes between Saturday and Monday.
Note that re = 0 in the event of no tax change, because when the tax rate does
not change, the company’s equity is simply earning the normal rate, or in other
words is earning zero excess returns.
Observing a change in P , as betting data permits us to do, allows us to back
out the full extent of the excess return due to a marginal reduction in the tax
rate. Suppose, for instance, that the probability of a tax cut goes from P to P ′.
Ignoring discounting issues over such short time periods, we have:
∆EP [re] ≡ EP ′ [re]− EP [re] = re(P ′ − P ),




With this reasoning in mind, I run specification 1.3 allowing for the effect of
each of the six dates considered to differ, and then I deflate the result for each date
by the change in probability of a corporate tax cut on that date, as measured by







































∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table (1.4) Regression results of specification 1.3 disaggregated by date and re-weighted by
∆P . Raw regression results are reported in Appendix A.3. Note that date 1 is included in the
analysis so as to not count it as a “control” day, but omitted in these results because there were
no bets on that day in the betting series we are considering. Standard errors clustered by day
in parentheses.
25
Results are reported in Table 1.4. The impact of market capitalization, mea-
sured in billions of dollars, remains small even though I am restricting the sample
to the top quartile of the market cap distribution, but again is likely to be the
victim of attenuation bias. The impact of the Lerner index small, due to the ma-
jor variation of the Lerner index in the data, as one can see in Table C.1. For
December 20, for instance, a one standard deviation change in Lerner index im-
plies an increase in returns of 29.9 percentage points. Results for the HHI look
even bigger in magnitude and statistically more significant. Compared to a firm
in perfect competition, these results suggest that a monopolist gained between 5
and 105 percentage points more due to the tax bill, depending on which date we
consider – a large and somewhat puzzling range. Overall, the betting data help us
see that there is a strong relationship between the gains from the tax bill and other
traditional measures of profitability and market power, which in turn motivates
the next empirical endeavor looking at the effects of the tax bill by individual firm.
Another interesting aspect of these results is how heterogeneous the measured
effects are across the dates considered. Even excluding results for September 27,
which would rely on a different betting series, there is considerable variation in the
magnitudes of these coefficients. If all the information that was released during
the dates this study focus on had to do with the probability of the bill passing,
and not with different provisions and updated expectations of the bill, then we
should observe roughly similar coefficients across each date after adjusting for the
“size” of each event date.
One way to explain this variation is that different versions of the tax bill were
being considered as time went on. This complicates interpretation, as it is far from
trivial to predict what investors were and were not surprised by as new versions
of the bill became available. In this sense, perhaps the last date under consider-
ation, December 20, bears the cleanest identification argument – as the bill had
undergone major changes which were by then established, and it was merely being
sent for signature by the President, which happened two days later. Taking this
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argument to its extreme conclusion implies very large effects of market power and
profitability on excess returns due to the tax cut.
1.5.4. The Distribution of Excess Returns
This section studies how the excess returns due to the news of the tax bill varied
across individual companies. The procedure simply models the abnormal returns
associated with our dates of interest to differ by each firm individually through
the following fixed-effects model:
Ri,t −Rft = ηi + ωiTCJADatest + ui,t. (1.4)
In this specification, ηi represents the average excess return of firm i on days other
than the six dates of interest, and omegai represents the average difference in firm
i’s returns on those dates. While this model allows estimating the effects of the
news firm by firm, it forgoes controlling for a number of forces that we were instead
able to control for in previous work.
The fixed-effects model exhibits two main differences compared to the differ-
ences in differences specification of section 1.5.2. First, as section 1.5.1 discusses,
the total impact of the bill is bound to include effects on aggregate quantities such
as the market return. The identifying assumption while using abnormal returns,
then, was that the parameters governing asset pricing did not change upon news
of the tax bill. In order to take the same approach while measuring the total effect
of the news, we’d need to know what the effect of the tax bill was on the risk
factors affecting asset pricing. For this reason, this section instead opts to look
at the effect on raw excess returns instead, and simply controlling for the average
return ηi.
Second, this model cannot control for time fixed effects. Section 1.5.2 was
purely interested in how the returns of companies with different measures Mi re-
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acted differently to news of the tax bill, which meant that all identifying variation
for the coefficient of interest was coming from variation across firms. Now that we
are interested in the effect of the news for each firm, instead, all the identifying
variation comes from differences for a given firm across time.
One downside of this approach is that it cannot separately control for how vari-
ables concerning firms’ foreign operations interact with news about the tax bill,
as variables on foreign operations only vary cross-sectionally. This means that ωi
captures the average effect of the tax bill as a whole, not just the reduction in tax
rates. One might think that this could mean results are driven by the international
provisions of TCJA, but Wagner et al. [2018b] provide evidence that the propor-
tion of income coming from abroad was not significantly correlated with excess
returns on some of the dates we are considering, while it was negatively correlated
in others. Rather than reflecting the overall provisions of the tax bill, thus, this
is likely reflective of an increase in the repatriation tax rate, as the authors them-
selves point out. This significantly reduces worries that the results of specification
1.4 might be driven by differences in exposure to provisions on foreign income.
Further, the empirical results of the previous section should reassure us that at
least part of what is being measured has to do with differences in productivity and
market power.
Results for specification 1.4 are plotted in Figure 1.4. The average increase in
returns is concentrated around zero, but has a long right tail, which is consistent
with the explanation regarding the increase in mark-ups and the concentration
of market shares offered by De Loecker et al. [2018]. As Appendix A.7 shows,
this same distribution is not typical of most dates, and cannot be replicated by
repeating the analysis with six dates chosen at random.
Weighing each date by the innovation in betting prices yields a clearer quan-
titative interpretation of the news on each day, similarly as in section 1.5.3. The
dummy variable for each date of interest in TCJADatest is substituted with the
change in odds on that date, and then equation 1.4 is estimated again. The re-
28
Figure (1.4) Distribution of average change in returns due to the news of the tax bill.
sulting distribution of excess returns is shown in Figure 1.5. Figure 1.6 shows how
the distribution of excess returns differed for more and less valuable companies.
Companies higher up in the distribution of profitability, as measured by the Lerner
index, were substantially more likely to experience a positive gain upon news of
the tax bill than other companies. This complements the analysis in section 1.5.2,
showing that smaller firms were not just more likely to have a smaller gains upon
the the tax cut, but also that they were more likely to have no gain at all – which,
in the language of equation 1.2, is what would not happen for a firm with no rents
(Πi2 = 0) and facing immediate potential entry (αi = 1).
Multiplying the excess return estimated in this procedure with a firm’s market
capitalization, one can calculate the implied total effect of the tax bill on a firm’s
valuation. Since this calculation uses the market capitalization at the end of fiscal
year 2016 avoid the possibility that considerations about the tax bill are already
reflected in this market capitalization, the result can be thought of as a proxy for
the real impact of the tax bill on the valuation of each firm. The resulting distribu-
tion of excess returns is reported for all firms in Figure 1.5, while the distribution
of projected valuation gains (in billions of U.S. dollars) is reported in Figure 1.7.
Again, the distribution exhibits a concentration around zero with a long right tail.
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Figure (1.6) Percent of companies with positive excess returns upon news of the tax bill based
on where they fall in the distribution of Lerner index.
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Figure (1.7) Distribution of the total dollar gain due to the tax bill for all firms.
A few well known companies where selected to showcase how much they gained
from the bill.
These results should be interpreted with some caveats. For example, only
27% of the estimated excess returns are statistically distinguishable from zero at
the 5% significance level. Furthermore, the median magnitude of the t-statistic
for each ωi is 1.17, indicating that many of these estimates have a high standard
error relative to their point estimate. Finally, using market capitalization a year
in advance means we can only proxy for the original value of each company.
With this in mind, Table 1.5 shows that not only did firms with a higher
profit margin gain a bigger share of the gains from tax reform, but that they did
so more than proportionally to their initial share of market capitalization. This
evidence reinforces the interpretation that the heterogeneity in excess returns due
to the tax cut was at least partly driven by differences in market power and the
possibility of rent-eroding entry.
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Percentile of tax bill gain: Top 1% Top 5% Top 10% Top 25% Top 50% Top 75%
Percent of total market value 22.0 45.1 53.3 63.4 69.6 70.8
Percent of total projected gain 50.6 88.0 103.6 122.5 131.4 132.4
Lerner index percentile: Top 1% Top 5% Top 10% Top 25% Top 50% Top 75%
Percent of total market value 2.3 7.2 10.5 47.3 78.4 93.7
Percent of total projected gain 3.3 13.3 18.6 50.7 80.9 100.7
Table (1.5) Percent of total market value and percent of total gain from the tax reform for
several percentiles of the distribution of the Lerner index and of dollar gains. Note that some
groups may earn more than 100 percent of the gains because some firms are impacted negatively.
1.6. Conclusion
This chapter studies how the market valuations of different U.S. publicly traded
corporations were affected by news regarding an imminent tax cut. The results
indicate that there was wide dispersion in the benefits of the tax cut. While the av-
erage impact was positive, some firms benefited little or not at all - indeed, roughly
a quarter of firms lost value upon news of the tax cut - while others benefited a
great deal. As noted in Table 1.5, these benefits were particularly concentrated
among the most profitable firms. This heterogeneity is consistent with heterogene-
ity in the potential competition that a firm faces.
The paper further investigates the link between the excess returns due to news
of the TCJA and market power. It finds that among the biggest firms, size is
weakly correlated with larger excess returns. It also finds that a firm’s excess
return is positively related to its accounting profit margin and its market concen-
tration. Using data from political betting markets, it becomes possible to assign
cardinal interpretations to these estimates, which suggest sizable effects that are
highly heterogeneous across dates. Using the date of last approval of the bill before
it was signed into law, these results suggest that on average a monopolist earned
an excess return 87.7 percentage points higher than a firm in perfect competition,
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and that moving up one standard deviation in the distribution of the Lerner index
of firms was linked with an average increase of 29.9 percentage points.
This chapter complements a growing literature documenting the rise of market
power in the U.S. An analysis of forward-looking financial markets’ response to
tax cuts suggests that market expectations are consistent with the historical trend
of a concentration of economic profit margins at the top of the distribution, in
keeping with the evidence found in other parts of the literature. These results also
contribute to the literature on corporate tax incidence. Responses to the tax cut
are consistent with heterogeneous economic rents, and therefore with the notion
that the shareholders of firms with high rents will bear much of the burden of
corporate income tax.
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Taxing a good results in a loss of economic efficiency whenever it distorts equi-
librium behavior away from the Pareto optimum. To the extent that agents do not
notice a tax, the burden of the tax is exacerbated by the fact that agents cannot
adjust the behavior to protect themselves from the tax. However, the burden of
the tax in excess of government revenue, or deadweight loss, is mitigated when
agents do not pay attention to the tax: if consumers pay the tax without noticing
it, they are effectively transferring some of their income to the government in a
lump sum. Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009, henceforth CLK) were the first to
make these points. In addition to their theoretical contributions, they also showed
that consumers in the U.S., where sales tax is applied at the register rather than
included on the prices displayed on shelves (or, “sticker prices”), tend to under-
react to sales taxes.
While CLK (2009) focuses on the case of homogeneous attention, recent work
by Taubinsky and Rees-Jones (2018, henceforth TRJ) has noted that introducing
the possibility of heterogeneous attention may prevent the computation of dead-
weight loss from aggregate data. If each person faced a different tax rate when
buying a certain good, understanding welfare effects would require us to study
not only aggregate demand, but the demand of every individual. Imposing a high
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tax on low elasticity individuals and a low tax on high elasticity individuals would
have a very different effect on welfare than doing the opposite. A similar reasoning
applies when all agents face the same tax rate, but perceive different tax rates.
TRJ (2018) find that allowing for heterogeneous attention introduces an issue of
allocative inefficiency that is normally absent from the study of the welfare effects
of taxation. In a world of heterogeneous attention, there is no guarantee that the
individuals who end up consuming the good are the ones who value it the most.
TRJ (2018) make these points in a binary choice model. This is well-suited
to their experiment, in which people are choosing whether or not to buy a cer-
tain object, but their proof does not generalize trivially. Given the predominance
of continuous choice settings in much of the literature on tax salience, including
CLK’s seminal paper, this motivates us to study the issue further.
We begin by developing a model of choice under misperceived prices with an
arbitrary closed consumption set, and develop our welfare measure: compensating
variation due to the tax, net of tax revenue. Bernheim and Rangel (2009) laid
the foundations of welfare analysis with behavioral agents. Our model is similar
to the models of CLK (2007, 2009) and TRJ (2018), but we slightly modify the
treatment of income effects, along the lines of Gabaix’s (2014) model of rational
inattention. In the absence of income effects, our model of choice for an individual
agent is essentially equivalent to the model in CLK (2009), except that we allow
for arbitrary consumption sets. Our model is also similar to the model of Chetty
(2009), but for the fact that we specify a particular way in which behavioral agents
maximize utility. While this does not impose severe restrictions on behavior, it of-
fers a useful framework when we move on to identification. We confirm that some
of the major results in CLK (2009) and TRJ (2018) hold quite broadly: inattention
to taxes increases the size of the loss in consumer surplus, but decreases the size of
deadweight loss; attention heterogeneity amplifies deadweight loss, and invalidates
CLK’s sufficient statistic approach.
The main contribution of this chapter is to generalize TRJ’s non-identification
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result to an arbitrary closed choice set. We show that an econometrician who only
observes aggregate consumption data can only determine the true value of aggre-
gate deadweight loss to lie on an interval. These bounds were first noted by TRJ
(2018) in their proposition A.2. We find these bounds hold generally and propose
to use them as a novel empirical tool.
The lower bound for deadweight loss is the calculation one would perform in the
case of a representative consumer. Since the loss in efficiency is a convex function of
the perceived tax rate, the calculation of deadweight loss from one perceived tax-
inclusive price consistent with aggregate demand will generically underestimate
deadweight loss. Heterogeneity in tax salience creates heterogeneity in perceived
net-of-tax prices, which creates an allocative inefficiency across consumers. As the
calculation with a representative consumer only accounts for inefficiency from ag-
gregate foregone consumption due to the tax, it will under-estimate excess burden.
However, in the case in which all agents pay the same amount of attention to the
tax, there is no allocative inefficiency between consumers, and so performing the
calculation as with a representative consumer yields the correct value for dead-
weight loss. The formula for this lower bound to deadweight loss is an extension
of formulas provided by CLK (2009) and TRJ (2018).
Following TRJ (2018), we obtain an upper bound for deadweight loss by let-
ting the econometrician assume that tax salience has support on a known bounded
non-negative interval. The upper bound comes from maximizing perceived price
heterogeneity, again exploiting the convexity of deadweight loss with respect to the
perceived tax. This is achieved by positing that agents have either zero or maximal
salience. Generalizing introduces two additional considerations in calculating the
upper bound for deadweight loss. One, a distribution yielding the upper bound
for deadweight loss assigns high tax salience precisely where it will “hurt” most:
to those agents whose particular preferences yield maximal deadweight loss from
that agent relative to the change in consumption of that agent. This distribution
allocates high tax salience to those agents who have more convex demand curves,
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keeping the aggregate change in quantity demanded constant. Two, deadweight
loss is maximized for a given aggregate demand if any agent with multiple opti-
mal decisions at the perceived price consumes the highest amount consistent with
their preference when they perceive low prices, whereas they consume the lowest
amount consistent with their preferences when they perceive high prices.1 This is
because heterogeneity in perceived prices permits different equilibria with the same
sticker price, tax rate, and aggregate consumption, yet yielding different values of
deadweight loss due to different distributions of consumption among individuals.
Our approach to compute the upper bound forces the econometrician to impose
limits on the possible values of attention – something that the empirical literature
has not settled yet and might be highly context-dependent. While it might seem
natural to assume that attention varies between zero and one, many papers have
found evidence of salience above one – see for instance Allcott and Taubinsky
(2015). In theory, one might allow for unlimited (positive) tax salience, under reg-
ularity conditions that avoid the possibility of unlimited distortion to consumer
behavior.2
Our general results follow the work of TRJ (2018), and rely on the fact that
the distribution of preferences is independent of taxes and prices, but that the dis-
tribution of salience might change depending on the value of the tax. Indeed, we
show that, even assuming that the distribution of preferences is entirely known to
the econometrician and invariant to observables, one cannot identify deadweight
loss.
We then turn to the special case in which demand is linear in a relevant range
where consumption is positive. This case is of particular interest for three reasons:
first, its ease of applicability; second, its special relationship to the second order
approximation of deadweight loss; and third, its illustrative value in the kind of
1TRJ (2018) do not deal with cases like this because they restrict attention to non-atomic
distributions of willingness to pay, so almost every agent has a unique choice that is perceived
to maximize utility.
2One might assume that consumer surplus is uniformly bounded to ensure that the upper
bound for deadweight loss is finite even if the upper bound for tax salience is infinite.
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problems we can face in identifying deadweight loss. In the case of binary choice,
non-identification ultimately comes from the possibility that taxes and attention
to taxes are not independent of each other. Although the experimental evidence
in TRJ (2018) suggests that attention varies with how large the tax is, if one as-
sumed away this possibility we could identify a full distribution of responsiveness
to both taxes and sticker prices using existing models of discrete choice with ran-
dom coefficients, as in Masten (2017) and Fox (2017). This estimated distribution
could then be used to yield a point-estimate of deadweight loss. In the case of
linear demand, instead, even assuming that attention and taxes are independent
would not help identify deadweight loss with aggregate data beyond the bounds
described above.
Our results complement a growing literature on tax salience. Rosen (1976) does
not find evidence of limited tax salience, but besides CLK (2009) and TRJ (2018),
Finkelstein (2009), Gallagher and Muehlegger (2011), and Goldin and Homonoff
(2013) all find strong evidence of dramatically limited tax salience. Most of this
literature looks at sales taxes in the U.S., as they lend themselves very credi-
bly to a story about lack of salience. However, work on salience has also looked
at other settings: Finkelstein (2009) studies car tolls; Weber and Schram (2016)
study whether income taxes being remitted by the employer or the employee af-
fects differently people’s attitude towards public spending and the burden of the
tax;3 Morone, Nemore and Nuzzo (2018) explore a similar question in the context
of a double-auction market. Blake, Moshary and Tadelis (2017) study how people
react differently to back-end and upfront fees in online purchases; and Bradley
and Feldman (2018) study how changes in the disclosure of ticket taxes affect the
demand for airlines. As we mentioned above, most of these empirical papers, as
well as other theoretically focused papers like Goldin (2015), use models where the
choice set is continuous or mixed discrete-continuous.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2.2, we develop a general model of
3Interestingly, assuming some agents face credit constraints as in Boadway, Garon, and Per-
rault (2018), also breaks traditional optimal tax theory.
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choice under misperceived prices. Once we have replicated some of the major the-
oretical results in CLK (2009) and TRJ (2018), we shift focus to identification of
deadweight loss. Section 2.3 lays out the main results of our paper, establishing
the non-identification result and the bounds. Section 2.4 focuses on the special
case in which demand is linear, and provides a straightforward way to compute
our bounds in the context of linear models. Section 3.5 concludes. Proofs and
other minor results are relegated to the online appendix.
2.2. Choice and Deadweight Loss under
Non-Salient Taxes
This section describes the theoretical model and results that underlie the rest
of this chapter. Many of our results here simply mirror previous literature, but we
make slightly different modeling choices. The main modeling challenge in dealing
with misperceived prices is to allow for the misperception of prices while keeping
agents financially solvent. CLK (2007, 2009) assume that one good “absorbs” all
optimization mistakes. In contrast our approach, inspired by parts of the model
in Gabaix (2014), has agents conjecture a certain income such that they end up
consuming on their true budget constraint when presented with the relative prices
they perceive. While this framework preserves all results of interest from CLK
(2009) and TRJ (2018), we find that our approach eases exposition while free-
ing the researcher from having to make ad-hoc assumption about which good (or
goods) absorb optimization mistakes. It should be noted that while we do gen-
eralize the model to include multiple taxed and non-taxed goods in the online
appendix, in the body of the paper agents will face a choice over two goods, only
one of which is subject to tax.
The agent has a closed consumption set X = XT × R+ ⊆ R2+. She also has a
choice function for the taxed good, q(p̄, pNT , τ,W ), with (p̄, pNT ) ∈ R2++, where p̄
and pNT are respectively the sticker price of the taxed and non-taxed good, τ ∈ R
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is the sales tax on the taxed good, and W is the income of the agent.4 We express
taxes as if they were specific, so that p̄ + τ is the tax-inclusive price of the taxed
good.
The agent has a continuous and strictly monotonic utility function u(q, qNT ),
where q denotes generic consumption of the taxed good. The choice vector func-
tion q(p̄, pNT , τ,W ) = (q(p̄, pNT , τ,W ), qNT (p̄, pNT , τ,W )) ∈ X meets two require-
ments. One, the agent spends all available income:5
(p̄+ τ)q(p̄, pNT , τ,W ) + pNT qNT (p̄, pNT , τ,W ) = W. (2.1)
Two, the agent correctly optimizes in the choice of all consumption bundles when
there is no tax:
q(p̄, pNT , 0,W ) ∈ arg max
{p̄∗q+pNT ∗qNT≤W}
u(q, qNT ). (2.2)
It turns out that this model is quite general, in the sense that it rules out very few
possible behaviors. Indeed, this model is equivalent to one in which agents pick
rationally given a perceived price ps, and conjecture themselves an income W s so
that they satisfy their true budget constraint at their perceived price. Proposition
2 and subsequent work in the online appendix shows that, under weak convexity
assumptions on preferences, one can find a pair (ps,W s) to satisfy equations 2.1
and 2.2 for any choice function q(·).
We now want some measure of the incidence of the tax on the consumer. For
concreteness, we consider the compensating variation due to the tax with complete
pass-through, defined as:
∆CS ≡ inf{∆W | u(q(p̄, pNT , τ,W + ∆W )) ≥ u(q(p̄, pNT , 0,W ))}.
4We implicitly restrict consideration to sticker prices, taxes, and income such that q(p̄, τ,W )
is well-defined at those values.
5When we consider multiple non-taxed goods in the online appendix, we also have agents












Figure (2.1) Welfare effects from the imposition of a non-salient tax.
In words, the change in consumer surplus is the greatest lower bound of the
amount of money the agent requires to achieve the utility reached before the impo-
sition of the tax. Online appendix proposition 3 shows that the change in consumer
surplus can be written as the sum of what consumer would have to be compensated
if the tax-inclusive price were actually ps and the income they “lost” due to their
inattention:
∆CS = (p̄+ τ − ps)h(ps)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Income lost
+ e(ps)− e(p̄)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆CS under ps
. (2.3)
This representation, which is graphically illustrated in figure 2.1, readily gives us
two interesting results. First, as noted by CLK (2007, 2009), if ps ∈ [p̄, p̄+τ ], then
the consumer will be worse off than if she paid attention to the tax:















Second, a consumer can be made better off by an increase in the tax, which we do
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not believe previous literature to have noted. This is because a tax increase can
induce inattentive agents to reduce their consumption of the taxed good to zero,
improving welfare for consumers who would have already avoided consuming the















(b) Under τ2 the consumer loses exactly total CS
Figure (2.2) The consumer in (a) is worse off than in (b), although she is subject to a lower tax
To obtain deadweight loss, we need to adjust ∆CS for the change in tax rev-
enue:7
dwl ≡ ∆CS − τq(p̄, pNT , τ,W + ∆CS) = e(ps)− e(p̄)− (ps − p̄)q(p̄, pNT ,W + ∆CS).
(2.4)
Note that deadweight loss is exactly as if the agent was correct that the tax-
inclusive price were ps.
To introduce heterogeneity, let i ∈ I index consumers. Each consumer is
characterized by her perception of the price of the taxed good, psi , type, θi, standing
in for her preferences θi and income Wθi , and tie-breaking parameter ζi, which we
6More formally, consumption does not necessarily have to be reduced to zero for the consumer
to be made better off. The loss of consumer surplus decreases in τ whenever the tax is sufficiently
high such that consumption is sufficiently small (but positive).
7We maintain the convention that deadweight loss is a generically positive value.
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need for technical reasons.8 These consumer-specific parameters are distributed
according to F ∗ps,θ,ζ . Each agent has a choice function for the taxed good, satisfying:




i ; θi, ζi) ∈ {q|∃qNT : (q, qNT ) θi q′ ∀q′ ∈ X : (psi , pNT ) ∗ q′ ≤ W si },
where psi and W
s
i are determined as in the model of section 2.2, with corresponding
expenditure function e(psi ; θi). If demand is single-valued, letting us ignore the tie-




[e(psi ; θi)− e(p̄; θi)]− (psi − p̄)q(psi ; θi)dF ∗ps,θ(psi , θi).
this chapter emphasizes continuous choice, as the binary choice case is worked
out in TRJ (2018). We momentarily assume that h is continuously differentiable
with respect to its own price, and that ps is continuously differentiable with respect
to τ . Then tax salience at a tax rate of zero is m = ∂p
s
∂τ
|(p̄,0).9 In line with existing
deadweight loss analyses, we can consider a second-order approximation, letting











i , θi). (2.5)
This process of aggregation makes apparent two important points that confirm
the analysis of TRJ (2018) extends naturally to continuous choice. First, allowing
for attention heterogeneity introduces an issue of allocative inefficiency, as it is
no longer guaranteed that consumers who value some units of the taxed good the
8ζi acts as a tie-breaker among bundles that could all have been chosen: choices do not
necessarily reflect true preferences when agents misperceive prices, and agents might appear
indifferent between choices that do not actually yield the same ex-post utility. This is in sharp
contrast with the neo-classical model, where the actual choice that one selects among indifferent
bundles has no impact on consumer surplus. But in this model of choice, different values of
conjectured income might yield different choices, even given the same preferences, perceived
prices, and true income.
9Formally, the claim is that there exist (ps,W s) such that ∂p
s
∂τ , where the derivative is taken
while the consumer is being compensated, is well defined. If ∂h∂p (p̄) 6= 0, then the Inverse Function











. If ∂h∂p = 0 in a neighborhood around p̄, then set
∂ps









most will be the ones who end up purchasing those units. It should be noted that
we are assuming throughout this chapter that supply is perfectly elastic, and so
tax increases will be reflected one-for-one in the after-tax price. This is not really
an issue of concern: as TRJ (2018) note, all that is needed to generalize this to
an arbitrary supply function is to account for the change in sticker price and the
change in profits to suppliers. Nonetheless, as in TRJ’s work, it is interesting to
deviate for a moment from this assumption, to consider what happens to aggre-
gate deadweight loss when supply is perfectly inelastic. In that case, we can use
























and DWL = 0 when attention is homogeneous, i.e. mi = m ∀i. Thus, a non-salient
tax may yield excess burden even without changing the equilibrium quantity, due
to its effects on allocative efficiency.
Second, allowing for heterogeneous attention introduces a serious problem of
















i , θi) are sufficient statis-
tics for the deadweight loss in equation 2.5. These points effectively extend some
of TRJ’s (2018) major results to continuous choice. In the next section, we formal-
ize this non-identification result with an arbitrary choice function, and show how
one might bound deadweight loss with mere information on aggregate parameters.
2.3. Non-Identification with Aggregate Data
This section discusses to what degree one can infer deadweight loss from ag-
gregate choice data. Our results generalize TRJ’s work on binary choice to an
arbitrary choice set. We find this to be of interest for two reasons. First, many
papers dealing with tax salience, including the seminal paper by CLK (2009),
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operate in a continuous choice setting. Second, while point identification is impos-
sible using aggregate parameters, we can still provide tight bounds based solely on
aggregate (or average) quantities.
For simplicity, we assume that the econometrician already knows the distribu-
tion of preference types, but this should not be considered a limiting assumption.
Consumer preferences can be identified with sticker price variation when there are
no (non-salient) taxes. Regardless, even when the econometrician can fully ob-
serve the true distribution of preferences, and how much aggregate consumption
there is at every tax level, she still cannot infer the exact value of deadweight loss.
However, we provide a lower bound and an upper bound for deadweight loss. The
lower bound is achieved by assuming that all agents perceive the same tax-inclusive
price, i.e. assume there is no attention heterogeneity. The upper bound for dead-
weight loss is achieved by imposing maximal attention heterogeneity. Since the
data do not reveal the individual variation in tax salience, one cannot point iden-
tify deadweight loss from aggregate data. Deadweight loss can take on any value
between the upper and lower bounds.10
The results in this section are described as if all agents face the same sales
tax. Also, since we are considering the problem of identification with aggregate
demand, we assume there are no income effects. This is because even the standard
model with fully salient taxes requires strong restrictions on income effects in order
to achieve identification with aggregate data, as the same income can yield dif-
ferent consumption bundles whenever there are several conjectured incomes that
solve the agent’s problem. Suppressing income and price for the non-taxed good,
we denote the consumption function for agent i with type θi and perceived tax-
inclusive price psi for the taxed good by q(p
s
i ; θi, ζi). However, all of these results
follow if one reinterprets q(psi ; θi, ζi) as the compensated choice of agent i.
To ensure integrability, we assume the econometrician knows that F ∗ps has sup-
port with lower bound greater than zero, and so only considers marginal distri-
10This claim follows by taking any weighted average of the distributions of parameters yielding
upper and lower bounds of deadweight loss.
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i , θi, ζi).
Deadweight loss for an individual i is a function of their expenditure function e(p)
and prices via:
dwl(psi ; θi, ζi) = e(p
s
i ; θi)− e(p̄; θi)− (psi − p̄)q(psi ; θi, ζi).








i , θi, ζi).
The problem of identification is to find conditions for which any joint distribution
Fps,θ,ζ of (p
s, θ, ζ), as a function of observable variables p̄ & τ , satisfying these
conditions and such that aggregate demand is rationalized; that is, such that for
any observed values of observable variables, any F satisfying
∫
psi ,θiζi
q(psi ; θi, ζi)dFps,θ,ζi(p
s
i , θi, ζi) =
∫
psi ,θi,ζi




i , θi, ζi), (2.6)
also yields the same value for deadweight loss:
∫
psi ,θi,ζi
dwl(psi ; θi, ζi)dFps,θ,ζ(p
s
i , θi, ζi) = DWL.
The main message of this section will be the failure of such a result obtaining.
We show that there are at least two distributions satisfying 2.6 that yield different
values of DWL. These two distributions also turn out to yield tight bounds to the
possible values of DWL that are consistent with aggregate demand.
Finally, we impose regularity conditions throughout this section to rule out
ill-defined integrals. Formally, we insist that the econometrician only consider
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distributions that satisfy the integrability conditions, described below.
Definition 1. A distribution Fps,θ,ζ satisfies the integrability conditions if:
1. q and dwl are integrable on any measurable set.
2. q(p; θi, z) is integrable on any subset of the support of θ for any p > 0 and
any z in the range of ζ.
For instance, all distributions with a finite support of (ps, θ, ζ) satisfy the above
conditions.
2.3.1. Lower Bound on Deadweight Loss
Consider arbitrary p̄, pNT , and τ . For arbitrary Fps,θ,ζ consistent with the
data, we can choose a price p̂s that could also rationalize the data if perceived
homogeneously.
Proposition 1. For any Fps,θ,ζ that yields integrable aggregate demand, there ex-





q(psi ; θi, ζi)dFps,θ,ζ(p
s






We can always rationalize the data with a joint distribution of (ps, θ) in which
θ has marginal distribution F ∗θ , whereas p
s = p̂s with probability one. We now
show that such a joint distribution provides a generic underestimate to the possible
values of deadweight loss.
Theorem 1. Consider any joint distributions Fps,θ,ζ and Fθ,ζ with corresponding
value p̂s such that:
∫
θ,ζ
q(p̂s; θi, ζi)dFθ,ζ(θi, ζi) =
∫
psi ,θi,ζi
q(psi ; θi, ζi)dFps,θ,ζ(p
s
i , θi, ζi).
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Then the following inequality obtains:
∫
θi,ζi
dwl(p̂s; θi, ζi)dFθ,ζ(θi, ζi) ≤
∫
psi ,θi,ζi
dwl(psi ; θi, ζi)dFps,θ,ζ(p
s
i , θi, ζi).
Intuitively, introducing heterogeneity in perceived prices can mute gains from
trade. If someone with a higher marginal valuation for the good has a higher per-
ceived price than someone with a lower marginal valuation, they could both gain
by trading with each other after making their consumption decisions. If they could
exchange with each other, the one who perceived the higher price could purchase
some of the good from the other agent, making both agents better off. Thus, ruling
out perceived price heterogeneity by assuming a homogeneous perceived price p̂s
eliminates the possibility of an allocative inefficiency. Figure 2.3 offers graphical
















(b) Low perceived price
Figure (2.3) A graphical illustration of Theorem 1. When one picks p̂s as to make the change
in demand equal for the consumer in (a) and in (b), the decrease in dwl for the consumer in (a)
(orange) must be at least as large as the increase in dwl for the consumer in (b) (green).
Theorem 1 points out that for any distribution that rationalizes the data, i.e.
that explains the observed aggregate demand, one can alternatively rationalize
the data with a homogeneous perceived price that yields (weakly) less deadweight
loss. From this, we can reach two conclusions. One, we generally cannot identify
48
deadweight loss because we could always alternatively rationalize the data with a
homogeneous perceived price.11 This holds even if we already knew the distribution
of preference types F ∗θ . Two, if there is a minimum value of deadweight loss that is
consistent with the data, that value of deadweight loss comes from a distribution
with no heterogeneity in tax salience.
2.3.2. Upper bound on deadweight loss
The upper bound comes from an assumption on the limits to tax salience:
Assumption 1. There is some value m̄ ≥ 0 such that ps has support known to be
contained in P ≡ [p̄, p̄+ m̄τ ].
This assumption says that agents must perceive a non-negative tax τ s no
greater than fraction m̄ of the true tax.12 The econometrician is allowed to assume
an arbitrarily large m̄, but the gain in robustness will likely come at the expense
of precision. For instance, setting m̄ = 1 would be to assume that agents never
over-react to a tax rate. Imposing that τ s ≥ 0 with probability one already ensures
that deadweight loss is no greater than the original consumer surplus.13 But the
interval restriction implies any distribution yields no more deadweight loss than a
distribution with “binary” perceived prices, i.e. where ps can only take on values
in {p̄, p̄+ m̄τ} ≡ ∂P .
The gist of the upper bound of deadweight loss is that, for any data-generating
process that rationalizes observed aggregate demand, there is another data-generating
process that also rationalizes observed demand, but which would yield at least as
much deadweight loss. This alternative explanation of the observed demand insists
that all agents pay either zero or maximal attention.
Before formally stating our main result, we demonstrate how one can always
11This claim holds generically, but would not hold, for instance, if there was no heterogeneity
in tax salience.
12This description implicitly assumes that τ > 0.
13Recall that deadweight loss equals its calculation as if taxes actually satisfied τi = p
s
i − p̄, so
excess burden cannot exceed the original consumer surplus for any agent. One can show that if
τs has support on negative values, then it’s possible to have total deadweight loss substantially
greater than the original total consumer surplus.
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pick such a distribution of attention to rationalize observed demand, for any under-
lying (known) distribution of preferences. Then, we state the main result, theorem
2, providing some intuition for why such a distribution would yield a weakly higher
deadweight loss. Because our model of choice may result in several choices given
the same sticker prices and taxes, sometimes there can be multiple equilibria with
the same level of aggregate demand, but different consequences for welfare. We
briefly discuss appendix theorem 3, which deals deals with such cases.
Consider any Fps,θ,ζ that rationalizes the data, and such that:
lim
m→m̄−
Fps(p̄+mτ)− Fps(p̄) > 0.
In words, the distribution assumes some positive mass of agents pay neither zero
nor maximal attention, i.e. m ∈ (p̄, p̄ + m̄τ) ≡ int(P). Pick p̃s ∈ int(P) and a
corresponding pb(psi ) ≡ p̄+ I(psi > p̃s)m̄τ such that:∫
psi∈int(P),θi
q(pb(psi ); θi, l)dFps,θ(p
s
i , θi) ≤
∫
psi∈int(P),θi,ζi
q(psi ; θi, ζi)dFps,θ,ζ(p
s




q(pb(psi ); θi, h)dFps,θ(p
s
i , θi).
In words, for any distribution that puts mass on int(P), we pick a value p̃s that acts
as a divide: those below it get assigned to a group that does not perceive the tax
at all, while those above it get assigned to a group that perceives it “maximally”.
Since demand is monotonic in p, and given our definitions of l and h, one can
always pick p̃s such that the above inequalities hold weakly. Thus, one can always




q(pb(psi ); θi, h)dFps,θ(p
s










q(psi ; θi, ζi)dFps,θ,ζ(p
s
i , θi, ζi).
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Equation 2.7 implies that we can always pick a threshold p̃s that rationalizes
demand, so long as we randomly assign a fraction λ of consumers with m ∈ int(P)
to the tie-breaking parameter ζ = h, and the remaining 1−λ to ζ = l. But in turn,
this implies that we have found binary distribution of ps and ζ that rationalizes
aggregate demand.
Let us call such distribution F ′′ps,θ,ζ . This new distribution has the same marginal
distribution of preferences, Fθ = F
′′
θ . If a consumer perceived a price in the bound-
ary region in the original distribution Fps,θ,ζ , then so will she in the new distribu-
tion: F ′′ps,θ,ζ|ps∈∂P = Fps,θ,ζ|ps∈∂P . As for those consumers who perceived a price in
the interior, we propose to split them up in a manner akin to what we just did in
equation 2.7: F ′′
pb(ps),θ
= Fps,θ, and ζ is assigned randomly as we described above.
One can quickly confirm that this distribution rationalizes the same demand as
the original distribution Fps,θ,ζ :
∫
psi ,θi,ζi
q(psi ; θi, ζi)dFps,θ,ζ(p
s
i , θi, ζi) =
∫
psi∈int(P),θi,ζi
q(psi ; θi, ζi)dFps,θ,ζ(p
s




q(psi ; θi, ζi)dFps,θ,ζ(p
s




[λq(pb(psi ); θi, h)
















i , θi, ζi).
Furthermore, such a distribution provides a generically larger value of deadweight
loss than does Fps,θ,ζ .










i , θi, ζi) ≥
∫
psi ,θi,ζi
dwl(psi ; θi, ζi)dFps,θ,ζ(p
s
i , θi, ζi).
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We can obtain intuition in two ways. One is to note that the method of forcing
binary perceived prices increases heterogeneity of perceived prices compared to
Fps,θ,ζ . Another is by considering the case where m̄ = 1 and F
∗
θ is known to be
degenerate, so that all agents have the same preferences. For a given aggregate
demand, deadweight loss is maximized under these preferences when some perceive
price psi = p̄, while others correctly perceived the true tax rate p
s
i = p̄+ τ . This is
because for each individual agent, deadweight loss is convex in the perceived price.
Hence, for a given aggregate demand, aggregate deadweight loss will be highest
when it is as high as possible for some – namely, those who fully perceive the tax
– while it is null for everybody else – as those who don’t perceive the tax at all
are effectively subject to a lump-sum tax. We provide a graphical illustration of


















(b) Low perceived price
Figure (2.4) A graphical illustration of Theorem 2. The watershed price p̃s is chosen to make
the change in demand equal for the consumer in (a) and in (b). As long as we are dealing with
weakly decreasing demand functions, the increase in deadweight loss for (a) is at least as big as
the green box, while the decrease in deadweight loss for (b) is at most as big as the orange box.
By assigning a perceived price of p̄ + m̄τ to the consumer in (a) and p̄ to the consumer in (b),
we have increased aggregate deadweight loss holding aggregate demand constant.
Theorem 2 illustrates that for any distribution of (ps, θ) that rationalizes the
data, we can alternatively rationalize the data with a distribution with support
for psi on {p̄, p̄ + m̄τ} that yields (weakly) greater deadweight loss. Again, we
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see that identification of deadweight loss is not generally possible even if we knew
the distribution of F ∗θ , as different marginal distributions of p
s and ζ could have
different implications for deadweight loss. Also, any upper bound to the possible
values of deadweight loss must be generated from a distribution with support of
perceived prices on {p̄, p̄+ m̄τ}.
However, not all distributions that have ps ∈ ∂P with probability one yield the
same value of deadweight loss, even when rationalizing the same data with the same
distribution of preference types. The allocation of the good that yields the highest
possible deadweight loss will also assign more consumption to agents with more
convex demand curves. Theorem 3 in the online appendix spells out how to assign
consumption of the good in the way it will “do the least good”, and deals with
cases where the tie-breaking parameter ζ is relevant, to get a general expression
for the upper bound for deadweight loss consistent with aggregate demand and
the distribution of preferences.
2.4. Linear Special Case
In this section, we discuss the special case in which q is known to be linear in
p̄ and τ (for fixed pNT ). We focus on this example both because of how frequently
economists estimate linear models and because of its relationship to the second
order approximation of deadweight loss.
We can also use the linear special case to better illustrate the general identifica-
tion problem. In this subsection, we will no longer assume that the distribution of
preference parameters is known; the econometrician will, as is usually the case, be
able to identify preferences with exogenous price variation. As in TRJ (2018), we
assume the distribution of preferences does not depend on taxes (or prices). Fur-
ther, we permit the econometrician to assume that the distribution of tax salience
does not change as sticker prices and taxes vary. This entirely rules out any sort
of endogeneity between attention and taxes – which was driving non-identification
in the binary case – and yet we will get the same non-identification result.
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Naturally, no demand curve can be entirely linear, for the simple reason that
agents cannot consume negative quantities. But in practice, one rarely gets the
privilege of such rich variation in prices when doing empirical work. What we are
implicitly assuming in this section is that the values of (p̄, τ) that are considered
are all such that p̄ > 0, and qi > 0 for all consumers in the market, so that aggre-
gate demand is also linear at those values. In other words, one can think of our
work here as modeling linear demand conditional on buying at all prices under
consideration.14
We might recall from section 2.2 that one can express a second order approx-
imation to deadweight loss as a function of derivatives. If the choice function is
linear in regressors p̄ and τ , the second order approximation is an exact calculation
of deadweight loss, and our results from the previous sections apply.
Formally, each preference type θi takes the form θi = (βi, εi) ∈ R2.15 To main-
tain linearity in regressors, we also assume that tax salience m is constant with
respect to τ . The choice function q then takes the form:
qi = α + βip
s
i + εi = α + βi[p̄+miτ ] + εi
We are suppressing the tie-breaking parameter ζ because in this linear example
θi,mi, p̄, and τ always uniquely determine consumption. We have the parameter
α so that we can assume without loss of generality that E[ε] = 0.
Defining β̃i ≡ miβi yields:
qi = α + βip̄+ β̃iτ + εi, (2.8)
14We thank an anonymous referee at the Journal of Public Economic Theory for helping us
clarify our thinking on this matter.




i . For a given p
NT , we define
βi ≡ iipNT , yielding utility representation Ui =
q2i /2−(α+εi)qi
βi
+ pNT qNTi .
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We assume that not just the distribution of preference parameters, but also the
joint distribution of preference and salience parameters remains unaffected by the
specific values of p̄ and τ . The econometrician observes for various values of
regressors:
E[q|p̄, τ ] ≡
∫
βi,β̃i,εi
[α + βip̄+ β̃iτ + εi]dF
∗
β,β̃,ε
(βi, β̃i, εi) = α + E[β]p̄+ E[β̃]τ. (2.9)
where F ∗
β,β̃,ε
is the true distribution of (β,mβ, ε). The challenge is to use the
observed values of triplets (p̄, τ, E[q|p̄, τ ]) to infer aggregate deadweight loss, which








E[m2β]τ 2 = −1
2
E[mβ̃]τ 2.
The only restriction that the econometrician imposes on the distribution of tax
salience m is that the support of tax salience is contained within the interval [0, m̄].
The econometrician can also use the Compensated Law of Demand as defined
in appendix lemma 2, which shows that compensated demand is always weakly
decreasing, so that P[β ≤ 0] = 1. In fact, we can permit the econometrician to
know the entire distribution of θ = (β, ε). It will not affect our results.} First,
we can find a homogeneous perceived price that rationalizes the data for any τ .
In particular, a linear regression of aggregate demand on sticker prices and taxes
may permit identification of β̂ ≡ E[β] and ˆ̃β ≡ E[β̃], respectively.16 We define a
16Such identification requires exogenous and non-collinear variation in sticker prices and taxes.
If the econometrician cannot identify these terms, so much the worse for identifying aggregate
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Then the homogeneous perceived price that rationalizes the data is p̂s = p̄+m̂τ . To
see this, note that assuming all agents have tax salience mi = m̂ yields aggregate

















= α + β̂p̄+ m̂ ˆ̃βτ
= α + β̂ p̄+ ˆ̃β τ.
Thus, the econometrician cannot rule out all agents perceiving the same price p̂s,





By theorem 1, this is a lower bound for deadweight loss.
Alternatively, the econometrician cannot rule out the perceived tax τ s having
support in {0, m̄τ}. To see this, consider P(ps = p̄ + m̄τ) = m̂
m̄
and P(ps = p̄) =
1 − m̂
m̄










dFβ,ε(βi, β̃i, εi) = α + E[β]p̄+ m̂E[β]τ
= α + E[β]p̄+ E[β̃]τ.
deadweight loss.
17If β̂ = 0, then let m̂ = 0.
18In the true distribution, it must be that m̂ ∈ [0, m̄]. Alternatively, one could consider
checking whether m̂ ∈ [0, m̄] as a weak test of the null hypothesis that tax salience is bounded
within that interval.
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E[β]m̄2τ 2 = −1
2
m̂β̂m̄τ 2 = −1
2
m̄ ˆ̃βτ 2.
For instance, if m̄ = 1, then the value of deadweight loss under a homogeneous
perceived price is fraction m̂ of the above calculation of deadweight loss.
Proceeding from theorem 2, we noted that there is a specific distribution of
perceived prices on {p̄, p̄ + m̄τ} that maximizes deadweight loss. We describe
that distribution in theorem 3, noting that it involves assigning high or low per-
ceived prices based on the ratio of per-person deadweight loss to the change in







Thus, the distribution of tax salience independent of all other parameters and
regressors in which P(m = m̄) = m̂
m̄
and P(m = 0) = 1− m̂
m̄
maximizes deadweight
loss. More generally, the econometrician cannot rule out this maximal value of
deadweight loss so long as they cannot rule out the possibility of some distribution
F with Fβ = F
∗
β such that supp(m) ∈ {0, m̄} with:
PF (m = m̄)EF [β̃|m = m̄] = m̂β̂ = ˆ̃β.
One can check that this distribution rationalizes the data,
E[q|p̄, τ ] = α + E[β]p̄+ EF [β̃]τ = α + β̂p̄+ PF [m = m̄]EF [β̃|m = m̄]τ = α + β̂p̄+ ˆ̃βτ,
and yields the maximal value of deadweight loss,
−1
2
EF [m2β]τ 2 = −
1
2
PF [m = m̄]m̄EF [β̃|m = m̄]τ 2 = −
1
2
m̄ ˆ̃βτ 2 = DWLhigh.
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More intuitively, once one knows β̂ and ˆ̃β, one can rationalize the aggregate data.
Since the ratio of deadweight loss to the change in quantity is constant, the rela-
tionship between tax salience and preferences doesn’t matter upon attaining the
observed aggregate demand.
Finally, consider a distribution with m ⊥ (β, ε) with supp(m) ⊆ {0, m̂, m̄},
P(m = m̂) = λ and P(m = m̄|m 6= m̂) = m̂
m̄










We can conclude from this result that one cannot even identify a second order
approximation of deadweight loss with aggregate data alone.19 Imposing structure
on preferences to facilitate identification of F ∗θ still only permits interval identifi-
cation. Nonetheless, we can use aggregate data to obtain bounds, or at least m̂,
which gives us a sense of the uncertainty over the possible values of deadweight
loss.
Besides its illustrative value, this linear framework also gives researchers a quick
and easy way to compute bounds for the deadweight loss of non-salient taxes or
fees in a variety of empirical contexts. In the online appendix, we apply these find-
ings to the framework of CLK’s study of aggregate beer consumption and Goldin
and Homonoff’s (2013) study of cigarette consumption. Details on the estimation
procedures are provided in the online appendix. In the baseline specification of
the CLK (2009) data, we estimate that m̂ ≈ 0.31. This estimate suggests that
even assuming that salience cannot exceed one, m̄ = 1, the upper bound of dead-
weight loss is about three times the lower bound. These estimates, however, all
seem fairly imprecise. Across the two data-sets, there is no specification in which
we can reject the null hypothesis that m̂ = 0, permitting the upper bound to be
arbitrarily large in proportion to the lower bound.20 Similarly, in most specifica-
tions we cannot reject that m̂ = 1, which would imply that upper bound and lower




= m̄m̂ , so that as m̂ approaches zero from above, this ratio of upper to
lower bounds blows up to infinity.
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bound are identical. This underlying uncertainty is mirrored in previous work on
tax salience – e.g., TRJ (2018) find that individual differences increase excess bur-
den by at least 200% relative to the case of homogeneous attention – but our wide
confidence intervals may be the result of the specific data sets we are using here –
for example, Goldin and Homonoff (2013) often cannot reject that consumers do
not react at all to sales taxes. Our procedure, however, seems so straightforward
to carry out that it might turn out useful in future research on tax salience.
Finally, in both the setting of CLK (2009) and Goldin and Homonoff (2013),
functional form assumptions seem to matter. The limitations of the linear setting
would prompt us to undergo more sophisticated and less parametric exercises, but
we are dissuaded by the fact that our statistical power is already very low.
2.5. Conclusion
In this chapter, we studied deadweight loss in a model where agents misper-
ceive prices. We started by generalizing the theoretical results of CLK (2007, 2009)
with an arbitrary closed choice set. Inattentiveness to taxes makes agents worse
off while reducing deadweight loss by preventing agents from avoiding the tax.
As in the binary choice model of TRJ (2018), heterogeneous attention adds an-
other layer of complexity to deadweight loss. In our general setting, we show that
aggregate consumption can be consistent with a wide variety of co-distributions
of attention and preferences, each with a different implication for deadweight loss.
This is because it matters who gets the good and who doesn’t: when prices are
misperceived, there is no guarantee that agents who end up with some units of the
good are the ones who value those units most. By minimizing and maximizing this
allocative inefficiency, we show that deadweight loss can only vary between two
extremes for any given aggregate demand. The lower bound holds generally, while
the upper bound relies on the assumption that tax salience has support contained
in a known non-negative interval.
Finally, we explore the special case in which demand is linear, which is of spe-
59
cial interest due to its relationship to both the empirical literature and the second
order approximation of deadweight loss. Our analysis shows that, while identifi-
cation of deadweight loss under binary choice may be restated as an endogeneity
problem, the same cannot be said regardless of the choice set. Indeed, when in-
dividual demand is linear, assuming independence of tax salience from taxes and
prices does not change the interval of possible values of deadweight loss.
The linear model yields bounds for deadweight loss that one can easily com-
pute from linear regression estimates. While this doesn’t necessarily doom any
future application in empirical work, our own applications of this method on the
existing work of CLK (2009) and Goldin and Homonoff (2013) leave us without
many answers about how tight these bounds might be. While some point esti-
mates seem reasonable, they also can be imprecise and dependent on functional
form specification.
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Analyses of the effects of tax changes often assume that these changes are per-
manent, or that they will unfold in a deterministic way. While this does offer
insight into policy recommendations, it poses a serious problem from a positive
stand-point. Since firms can observe the political process, they form expectations
about future policy, which will influence their present behavior. Indeed, tax uncer-
tainty distorts firms’ incentives by affecting both the timing of their investments
and the risk profile they face. While previous work has been focused on the former,
this chapter is concerned with the latter.
While previous work about policy uncertainty was concerned with beliefs about
the distribution of future taxes, this chapter has a broader concern with the joint
distribution of a firm’s pre-tax returns and its tax obligation. We demonstrate
that agents particularly care about the covariance of future taxes with future
productivity. For instance, suppose a risk-neutral investor is considering an in-
vestment that costs $3. The investment will either pay $10 or $0, each with equal
probability. The government taxes the revenue from this investment at a rate of
either 50% or 0%, each with equal probability. The investor’s expected payoff
clearly depends on when she will get taxed. If the investor believes that the tax
kicks in only when the investment is successful, then her expected after-tax pay-
off will be 1
2
10(1 − 0.5) + 1
2
0(1 − 0) = 2.5 < 3, and she will not undertake the
61
investment. If, on the other hand, the investor believes that the tax applies only
when the investment is unsuccessful, then her expected after-tax payoff will be
1
2
10(1 − 0) + 1
2
0(1 − 0.5) = 5 > 3, and she will undertake the investment. Note
that in either case the marginal distributions of pre-tax payoffs and tax rates are
exactly the same; what pushes the investor to invest or not invest is her belief
about their correlation.
As we note in our theoretical model, what ultimately matters to a firm is the
covariance between its marginal tax rate and the marginal product of its inputs.
Interestingly, the same mechanism can arise when there is no uncertainty about
tax policy, but the tax schedule is not linear. This point goes far back in the liter-
ature on the effects of income taxation: Domar and Musgrave (1944) pointed out
that when the government does not rebate taxes on corporate losses, this creates
a piecewise linear tax schedule with a kink at zero: up to zero the marginal tax
rate is zero, after zero there is a positive marginal tax rate. Since the government
punishes profits more than it compensates losses, this disincentivizes investment1.
Our model generalizes this point. Whenever the tax schedule is convex, this will
automatically generate a positive covariance between the marginal tax rate and
productivity, which has the effect of depressing investment. Further, the same
effect can arise even if the tax schedule is linear, but firms are uncertain about
what the marginal tax rate will be.
This chapter investigates how policy uncertainty affects the risk profile faced
by firms and how this affects their choices, both theoretically and empirically. In
section 3.2, we enter into the details of the literature on tax changes, policy un-
certainty, and investment, with an eye both on how people have thought about
the effects of policy uncertainty in the past, and the empirical evidence they have
gathered. Section 3.3 lays out our full theoretical model. As we mentioned, this
can be done using a simple model where decisions are taken statically, though fac-
1While the main point of Domar and Musgrave’s paper was how proportional income taxation
affects risk-taking by individuals, they also had a number of other points relating to how taxation
interacts with uncertain payoffs.
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ing uncertainty. Our model can accommodate any tax schedule, and allows for any
aspect of said tax schedule to change stochastically. Then, we take our theoretical
observations to data in section 3.4. We conclude in section 3.5.
3.2. Background
Public economists have long been thinking about how the prospect of tax changes
affects economic choices in general, and investment in particular. We could sepa-
rate these works in two branches: one concerned with “mean effects”, and another
concerned with “variance effects”. The question in the first branch is: how does
the future expected level of taxation affect a firm’s investment decision? In this,
one should include all models that assume perfect foresight. Auerbach and Hines
(1988) is an early example of papers in this branch. In a perfect foresight model,
they find that anticipated tax changes carry a lot of weight in explaining firm
behavior, relative to a model of myopic expectations. Other examples include
Poterba (1989) and Slemrod and Greimel (1999). The first paper shows how the
yield spread between taxable and tax-exempt bonds responds to changes in ex-
pected individual income tax rates by performing event studies around the time
of unexpected tax changes. The second goes a step further, and proxies changes
in expectations with the odds of Steve Forbes winning the presidency in 19962,
finding some evidence for a possible causal relationship. Rodrik (1991) also dis-
cusses how expectations of future policy interact with current decisions. He makes
the point that in order for economic reform to have its desired impact, investors
must believe it to be persistent. He models uncertainty as a probability of policy
reversal, and shows that if previous policy and the reform are distant enough, even
a small probability of reversal can act as a hefty tax on investment.
The second branch of this literature is concerned not only with the effects of
changes in expectations, but also (and particularly) with the effects of uncertainty
2Steve Forbes was an outspoken advocate of a “flat-tax” that would have erased the differential
tax treatment.
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itself. While the common view on the topic is that policy uncertainty deters invest-
ment, early models of investment under uncertainty, such as Hartman (1972) and
Abel (1983), show that, in fact, the optimal capital stock should actually increase
in the face of uncertainty about output price. Pindyck (1988) makes the point
that these results rely heavily on the assumption of reversibility of the investment.
Hassett and Metcalf (1999) make a similar point in the context of uncertainty re-
garding investment tax credits: uncertainty affects the timing of investment. We
may also include Skinner (1988), who notes that net-of-tax income may become
less uncertain if the income tax rate is positively correlated with pre-tax income.
In his model, he is thinking about the welfare effects of income uncertainty for
risk-averse agents, while we focus on risk-neutral firms.
More recent literature has found similar theoretical insights. When investment
is (partially or fully) irreversible, uncertainty has the effect of delaying investment.
Bloom (2009) makes this point in a model where firms face costly adjustments both
for capital and labor decisions. He shows that if one assumes an (s, S) solution to
the firm’s optimal investment and hiring policy, a mean-preserving spread in the
distribution of taxation results in an increased area of inactivity for the firm.
Whereas these two branches of the literature focus on the mean and variance
of future policy, this chapter focuses on the covariance between tax rates and pro-
ductivity. We are unaware of any previous literature that considers the impact
of this covariance. The paper that comes closest to discussing the mechanism we
illustrate here may be Domar and Musgrave (1944). They discuss tax regimes
that are non-linear functions of profit. We generalize their results in a way that
allows us to consider cases where the tax schedule is itself uncertain, which they
explicitly exclude.
To understand why it is so important to think about how policy uncertainty
affects economic decisions, one should first realize that this represents a very con-
crete problem to all agents in an economy. To discipline thinking, let us try to
think about why agents face uncertainty about policy. One reason might be that
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governments decide to condition their policies on uncertain states of the world. For
instance, governments might decide to enact different policies during booms and
recessions; if agents are uncertain about when booms and recessions will begin and
end, then they will also be uncertain about economic policy. Further, this would
automatically generate a non-zero covariance between uncertain fundamentals that
affect firm profitability and policy. Another reason why policy uncertainty might
arise is that the political processes can be inherently uncertain. In the absence
of median-voter theorem type results, which fail, for example, whenever policy is
more than one-dimensional, different candidates will run on different platforms. If
all candidates are running to win, the outcome of the election will be inherently
uncertain. Indeed, one could easily imagine a world where the ultimate outcome of
the election depends on some underlying state of the world, unobservable to politi-
cians, that also affects the productivity of firms; if people are more optimistic, say,
they will consume more and increase firm profits, and vote for candidate A; if
people are more pessimistic, they will consume less and decrease firm profits, and
vote for candidate B.
At the root of this second source of policy uncertainty lies the inability of gov-
ernments to commit. If a government could at any point tie the hands of all future
governments to enact a certain policy, then the only possible source of uncertainty
would arise from the government conditioning their policy on underlying funda-
mentals. But, as a matter of fact, governments have at best an imperfect ability to
commit. Persson and Tabellini (1999) review many examples of political economy
games where equilibria can change radically depending on whether the government
has access to a commitment technology. Early analyses of optimal capital income
taxation, such as Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985), all mention, almost offhand,
that if lump-sum taxation were available, then the optimal policy would be to have
a lump-sum levy on all wealth existing in period 0, leaving untouched the product
of future investment. But such a policy would only be optimal in an environment
where the government can credibly commit to never raising a capital levy again.
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Kehoe (1989) takes this a step further, and shows that in fact the ability of govern-
ments to commit to cooperating with other governments is not necessarily optimal
for society, even in a world where all governments are benevolent. While in this
chapter we focus on the problem from the point of view of the firm, it would be
complementary to our analysis to think about a government engaged in a game
with firms might optimally decide to promise one thing and then do another when
a certain state of the world is realized, or might decide to play a mixed strategy
in equilibrium, leaving firms guessing as to the action it will actually take.
Our empirical work looks at how the stock market return on different firms,
whose profitability is correlated in different ways with tax policy, varies upon a
policy uncertainty shock. We decide to take this route rather than directly as-
sessing the impact of policy uncertainty on investment for three reasons. First,
as we explain in section 3.3, the mechanism linking the covariance of productivity
and policy to the investment decision is exactly the same mechanism linking that
covariance to firm profits. Third, our mechanism relates to policy and uncertainty
shocks that are ex-ante uncertain to firms. In this sense we differ a lot from pre-
vious literature regarding productivity, which tends to treat it as an observable
parameter, or at least a parameter known to firms or private individuals. As a
result, we do not find it sufficient to look at how firms react to realizations of
these uncertain parameters, because our theory has to do with their ex-ante belief,
not with what will ultimately realize. Short of ripping people’s heads open to
observe their beliefs, the next best thing we can do is to look at scenarios, like
stock markets, where expectations about future profitability are instantaneously
incorporated into observable prices.
Our empirical strategy is indebted to papers that use stock market evaluations
to infer the effects of policy, such as Cutler (1988), or Friedman (2009), besides the
aforementioned Poterba (1989) and Slemrod and Greimel (1999). Baker, Bloom,
and Davis (2016) develop an index of policy uncertainty based on newspaper cover-
age, the number of expiring tax provisions, and disagreement amongst forecasters,
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which will be prominent in the empirical investigations of this chapter. They show
that policy uncertainty tends to be correlated, among other things, to decreases in
stock market returns. While Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016) take a more “reduced-
form” approach, Handley and Limão (2017) have a more structural bend. In the
context of trade policy, they develop a structural model, and estimate it around
China’s 2001 WTO accession, which drastically reduced uncertainty regarding
trade policy between China and the U.S.
3.3. Framework
Expectations about future policy will influence decisions of firms in the present
by distorting the distribution of their after-tax returns. As we have seen in section
3.2, this can happen in several ways: through changes in the first moment of policy,
through changes in the second moment of policy, or through changes in the mixed
moment between policy and other stochastic determinants of profitability. In this
section we focus on this last mechanism. The model presented here, however, can
also be interpreted to study first-moment effects, and we are actively working on
extensions that would allow us to incorporate second-moment effects, by adding
adjustment costs. Having a fuller picture might help us to see how all these
different ways in which policy uncertainty affects firm profits act, both in isolation
and in concert with each other.
We start with a model of uncertainty in a simple cash-flow tax. A firm has
to decide on its scale of operations, facing a certain rate of deduction today, but
an uncertain tax rate on tomorrow’s revenue, as well as uncertain revenue. This
example is particularly informative because it shows how our mechanism can arise
from policy uncertainty in an environment that would otherwise leave the firm’s
decision undistorted. However, we want to stress that this point holds very broadly,
and under several definitions of policy uncertainty. Similarly to the set-up in
Rodrik (1991), one can effectively think of “tax collected” as any policy provision
that reduces (or enhances) the profitability of investment, as long as government
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policy depends in any way on an (uncertain) final output. As we show later in this
section, our point holds under a largely arbitrary tax system, and the flexibility
in our definition of what constitutes a “tax” is reflected in the flexibility of our
theoretical framework.
Suppose that an agent had to pick how much to invest, x, in a risky project,
which will produce an uncertain amount εf(x), where f(x) is a known, strictly
increasing, and strictly concave function, while ε is stochastic. The agents fortunes
unfold in two periods: in the first period, the agent decides how much to invest,
and gets to deduct expenses, x, against the current tax rate, τ0; in the second
period, the agent’s revenue is realized, εf(x), and it is taxed at rate τ1. Assuming
for simplicity that all prices are equal to unity, and that the agent values equally
profits in both periods, we can write down her problem as:
maxxE
[
(1− τ1)εf(x)− (1− τ0)x
]
. (3.1)
Let us start with the case where τ0 and τ1 are both known. Letting x
∗ be the
argmax to the problem in equation 3.1, the firm’s expected profits are:
Π̄ = E
[
(1− τ1)εf(x∗)− (1− τ0)x∗
]
= (1− τ1)ε̄f(x∗)− (1− τ0)x∗
≡ Π(τ0, τ1, ε̄, x∗) (3.2)
where ε̄ = E[ε]. Thus, in a world were tax policy is known ex-ante, the two tax rates
τ0 and τ1 simply reduce (or increase) the firm’s costs and revenue, respectively. If
τ0 = τ1 = τ , then an increase in the tax rate simply scales down expected profits
proportionally. Note that in this last case the firm’s choice of inputs remains
undistorted relative to the case of no taxes. In general, the firm’s optimal choice
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If τ0 = τ1, then the firm will pick x
∗ = 1/ε̄, or the efficient choice it would have
made had all tax rates been identically zero.
Now let us suppose that while τ0, the current tax rate, is known, τ1, the future
tax rate, is not. The key insight here is that now the firm will care not about the
marginal distributions of ε and τ1 respectively, but about their joint distributions.
Expected profits are now:
Π̄ = E
[
(1− τ1)εf(x∗)− (1− τ0)x∗
]
= E[(1− τ1)ε]f(x∗)(1− τ0)x∗
= Π(τ0, τ̄1, ε̄, x
∗)− f(x∗)ρστ1σε, (3.3)
where τ̄1 = E[τ1], ρ = corr(τ1, ε), στ1 =
√
V ar(τ1), and σε =
√
V ar(ε). As we can
see, the tax still has the same proportional effect on expected revenues and costs
as in 3.2, but with the addition of a new term involving the covariance between
tomorrow’s tax rate and productivity. For given expected tax rate τ̄1, an increase
in the variance σ2τ1 will reduce profits when ρ is positive, and will increase them
when ρ is negative.
More formally, by the Envelope Theorem, since the derivative of expected profit
with respect to investment is zero, we have that if we marginally change στ1 holding
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Thus, when ρ is positive (negative), we should see that higher policy uncertainty,
in the form of a higher στ1 , decreases (increases) expected profits. This reasoning
lies at the foundation of our empirical work. If the firm’s stock market evalua-
tion is given by its expected future stream of profits, it follows that unexpected
increases in policy uncertainty should be associated with an increased evaluation
if ρ < 0, and a decreased evaluation if ρ > 0.
This same mechanism is reflected in the choice of investment. Under a stochas-
tic second-period tax rate, the optimal choice of investment is:






If the tax rate and productivity were independent, so that ρ = 0, then one could
induce the same efficient choice that the firm would make when all taxes are iden-
tically zero by setting τ0 = τ̄1, similarly as in the case where all taxes are known
ex-ante. However, if ρ 6= 0, then one should adjust the rate of first-period input
deductibility to reflect this fact: τ0 = τ̄1 + ρστ1σε/ε̄. Thus, if the tax rate is posi-
tively correlated with productivity, the firm will need to be compensated for input
expenses more than the expected tax rate it will face on revenues. If instead the
tax rate is negatively correlated with productivity the opposite will be true, since
the firm knows that the tax rate will tend to be lower than average in states of
the world where the investment reveals to be more productive. When the covari-
ance is positive (negative), the firm will face a lower (higher) expected profit, the
3It might be unclear what we mean by changing a standard deviation while holding other
parameters of the joint distribution constant. More formally, one can write τ1 = τ̄1 + z, where z
is a random variable with mean zero and variance σ2τ . Then we could perform a transformation
by scaling z by some constant c > 0, τ = τ̄ + cz, which would increase the variance of τ and
the covariance of τ and ε while leaving the mean tax and the correlation coefficient the same.
In that case, equation 3.4 states the partial derivative of expected profit with respect to c when
στ = 1.
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covariance acts as a tax (subsidy), and so the firm is less (more) willing to invest.
As noted in the introduction, this reasoning extends beyond political uncer-
tainty about future policy. Whenever a tax system is progressive,4 marginal tax
rates will automatically increase whenever a business venture is more successful,
thereby inducing positive correlation between the tax rate and the productivity of
inputs. In this case, an equal increase of tax rates at all corporate income levels
would discourage input use. Conversely, if the tax system was regressive, an equal
increase of tax rates at all corporate income levels would encourage input use.5 To
clarify ideas, let us consider a more general model.
A firm has to decide how much to invest, x, on a risky project. Pre-tax profits
are:
π(x, ε) = εf(x)− x,
where ε is an ex-ante uncertain Hicks-neutral productivity shock. The firm faces
a tax T (εf(x), x, ε), and can vary depending on realized revenue εf(x), as well as
input costs x, and the underlying productivity realization ε. The firm takes the
decision before ε is realized, to maximize expected after-tax profits:
maxxE[π(x, ε)− T (εf(x), x, ε)]. (3.6)
Again letting x∗ denote the optimal choice of investment, and then taking a first-
order Taylor expansion of T (·) in its first argument, we obtain that expected profits
are now:
Π̄ ≈ π(x∗, ε̄)− T̄ (x∗)− f(x∗)C(x∗), (3.7)
4As, e.g., the federal corporate tax system used to be in the U.S. before the Tax Cuts and
Jobs Act of December 2017, and as it currently is in many U.S. states.
5While this point is a natural implication of our model, the observation originates in Domar
and Musgrave (1944). However, they do not consider uncertain tax rates.
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where T̄ (x) = E[T (ε̄f(x), x, ε)], and C(x) = cov(T1(εf(x), x, ε), ε). For the sake of
clarity, let us specify that we use subscripts on T (·) to indicate the argument with
respect to which we are taking partial derivatives; thus T1 indicates the partial
derivative of T (·) with respect to its first argument. Again, we see a similar
reasoning as in equation 3.3.
Once again, we have similar implications for investment. Taking the FOC of





= 1 + T̄2(x)
Where T̄1(x) = E[T1(εf(x), x, ε)] is the expected marginal tax (or subsidy) on
revenue, and T̄2 = E[T2(εf(x), x, ε)] is the expected marginal tax discount (or
penalty) given for input use. All expectations are, of course, taken conditional
on investment, as that is the control variable in the firm’s problem. The firm’s
optimal choice of investment is now:







Note that when there is no productivity uncertainty, or if productivity uncer-
tainty is uncorrelated with the marginal tax rate, then C(x) = 0 for any choice of
x, so that equation 3.8 yields x∗ = f ′−1(1 + T̄2(x)/ε̄(1 − T̄1(x))). Again, we have
that firms are allowed to deduct expenses at the same marginal rate as they are
taxed on revenue (that is, T1(εf(x), x, ε) = −T2(εf(x), x, ε) for all (x, ε)), the firm
will make the efficient choice that it would make in the absence of taxation. This
echoes the long standing result that taxing profits does not distort firm decisions.
However, in our case, as the covariance between the marginal tax rate and the
productivity of investment becomes larger, since f ′−1(·) is a decreasing function,
optimal investment declines.
There are two noteworthy cases in which the covariance of marginal tax rates
and productivity distorts investment. The first, more well known case is where
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the tax revenue function T (·) is known ex-ante, so that it does not depend on ε
conditional on realized profit, T (εf(x), x, ε) = T (π(x, ε)). In this case, the covari-
ance may be non-zero because the tax revenue function T is non-linear, and so
the marginal tax rate is not constant. This relates to a classic point originally
made by Domar and Musgrave in 1944. When the government has a constant
tax rate on positive firm profits, but does not remit payment to firms that realize
net negative profit, then it is discouraging investment whenever firms fear they
could make negative profit upon a sufficiently poor productivity realization. More
generally, if T (·) is a convex function of profits, and if there is any uncertainty in
ε, then cov(T ′(π(x, ε))ε) must be positive for any positive value of x.6
The less studied case where the covariance of the firm’s marginal tax rate and
its productivity comes into play is one where the tax rate is both uncertain and
correlated with productivity. This is precisely the sort of case we consider at the
beginning of the section. That example, although it presents an unrealistic tax
system, gives us two important insights. First, policy uncertainty might affect
firms in a way that we haven’t really contemplated in the past, by distorting the
risk profile they face with their investments. Even though there is no “timing”
of the decision to speak of, as all decisions in the model are taken before the un-
certainty is realized, firms change their decisions in the face of policy uncertainty
whenever they believe that policy correlates with the pre-tax productivity of their
investment. It should be noted, however, that by adopting a static model we are
implicitly assuming complete irreversibility of investment. “Partial” irreversibility
can be obtained by adding adjustment costs, say 1
2
ξ(x− x(τ, ε))2 for some ξ > 0,
which would preserve our main results7. Second, how firms react to uncertainty
shocks in the tax depends on how their productivity is correlated with said tax. By
observing how firms (or their expected profits) react to policy uncertainty shocks,
then, we should be able to infer how their productivity is correlated to policy. This
observation is at the foundation of our empirical application, which we dive into
6To be more precise, C(x) ≥ 0, with strict equality assured if T (π) is strictly convex.
7More formal results on this on their way.
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next.
3.4. Empirics: a CAPM Approach to Policy
Uncertainty
As we mention in section 3.3 our empirical methodology looks at stock market
prices, which are tied to the expected profitability of a firm. As we have seen in
our theoretical model, the expected profits of a firm will react differently to policy
uncertainty shocks depending on how they are correlated with firm productivity.
While all of our work so far has presumed a neutral attitude to risk, the distortion
of the risk profile of investment will affect risk-loving or risk-averse agents, too.
As the foundation of our empirical strategy is a capital asset pricing model that
presumes agents are averse to risk, we formally develop a finance model in section
3.4.1. Section 3.4.2 takes a more practical look at the data and methodology we
use. Finally, we present preliminary results and discuss future work in section
3.4.3.
3.4.1. An ICAPM Model of Policy Uncertainty
Consider the problem of h = 1, . . . , H infinitely lived agents who, every period,
have to decide how much of their wealth Wht to consume, cht, which gives them
utility uh(cht), and what share of their saved wealth to invest, πht = [πh1t, . . . , πhNt],
on N assets. Investment opportunities depend on market risk, as well as policy
risk, denoted by state variable Pt. Here we are going to treat Pt as a scalar
representing the variance of a policy variable, but one could easily obtain the
same results thinking of Pt as a vector of moments for the same variable. Pt is
assumed to move according to a first-order Markov process. The Bellman equation




uh(cht) + δhEt[Vh,t+1(Pt+1, (Wht − cht)π′htRt+1)]
∣∣∣1′πht = 1],
(3.9)
where subscript t indicates expectations taken conditional on information avail-
able at time t, for some discount factor δh ∈ (0, 1). As in Back (2010) (p. 194-195),
the envelope condition and the fact that the ratio of marginal utilities is a one-








Since Zh,t+1 is a one-period SDF, we have that, by definition, for any pair (i, t):
Et[Zh,t+1Ri,t+1] = 1. (3.12)







Taking a first order Taylor approximation of Vhw(Pt+1,Wh,t+1) around (Pt,Wh,t),
and adding over all households, we obtain our (approximate) CAPM equation:




























where the argument of V (·) is (Pt,Wh,t) unless otherwise noted, and the last
approximate equality holds as long as Et[∆Wt+1] ≈ 0 and Et[∆Pt+1] ≈ 0.
3.4.2. Data and Empirical Strategy
Our data comes from three different sources. First, we use Baker, Bloom and
Davis’s (2016) Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) index, which forms an index
of policy uncertainty based on:
1. Newspaper coverage from 10 major newspapers containing policy-related
words;
2. How many federal tax code provisions are set to expire in the next 10 years;
3. Dispersion in the forecasts of the CPI, federal expenditures, and state and
local expenditures by individual forecasters in the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia’s Survey of Professional Forecasters.
The EPU index varies monthly and is available for over 30 years, from 1985 on-
wards. We might also be interested in data on government expenditure in pro-
portion to GDP, which Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016) sometimes use in their
regressions as a control for the first moment of government policy. Second, we use
monthly returns from CRSP on the stock of publicly traded firms between 1985
and 2014. Third, we match these financial data with Compustat quarterly data
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about firm fundamentals, namely market capitalization, book value, sector, and
foreign income. We restrict attention to firms for which data is available through-
out our sample period, which runs from 1985 to 2014.
Conceptually, the data set consists of a set of monthly returns for i = 1, . . . , N
assets over t = 1, . . . , T periods. Our method is heavily inspired by Fama and
French (1993) and their (and others’) subsequent work on empirical models of as-
set pricing. Our empirical model makes use of the Fama-French framework and
adds another state variable, policy uncertainty. The idea here is that policy un-
certainty poses a separate source of systemic risk which is not necessarily priced
into the returns on the market portfolio. The idea here is that if we were looking
at all savings opportunities of agents we would find a “naked” CAPM to hold, but
since we are looking only at a subset of assets there will be other state variables of
interest. We think of policy uncertainty as a state variable which in part governs
what investment opportunities are available. We give a more formal derivation
of an intertemporal-CAPM model in which policy uncertainty pops up as a state
variable in a CAPM-style equation in section 3.4.1.
Our empirical model is:
E[Rit −Rft] = βimE[Rmt −Rft] + βisE[SMBt] + βihE[HMLt] + βipE[EPUt],
(3.18)
where Rit is the return on portfolio i in period t; Rft is the risk-free rate of
return; SMBt (Small Minus Big) and HMLt (High Minus Low) are the difference
in returns between diversified portofolios of small and big firms (in terms of their
market capitalization) and between diversified portfolios of high- and low-BE/ME
ratio firms (Book Evaluation/Market Evaluation)8; EPUt is the EPU index; and
the β’s are coefficients on the OLS regressions of (Rit−Rft) on (Rmt−Rft), SMBt,
HMLt, EPUt. Because firm fundamentals like total assets (used to compute
8These factors are the ones used in Fama and French (1993) and many subsequent pieces that
have been found to work particularly well.
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market value and book value) are only available quarterly, quarters are our basic
time unit here. This prompts us to estimate the following equation:
Rit −Rft = αi + βim(Rmt −Rft) + βisSMBt + βihHMLt + βipEPUt + uit,
(3.19)
where uit is a mean-zero i.i.d. error term.
While our methodology is heavily inspired by the financial literature on empir-
ical tests of CAPM models, our intent is not to re-invent the CAPM. As a result,
we find it of interest to run a “naked” version of the CAPM without SMB or
HML, as well. This allows us to get a slightly bigger sample size9, as well as to
run the regression monthly. Our second regression estimates:
Rit −Rft = αi + βim(Rmt −Rft) + βipEPUt + uit. (3.20)
What we are ultimately interested in are the coefficients on EPUt, for two reasons.
First, we are interested in documenting which kinds of firm returns tend to do
better or worse when policy uncertainty increases. As showcased in section 3.3,
this should tell us about how their own productivity is correlated with policy.
To study this, we cut the sample according to three different classification: by
sector, by multinational status10, and size (as measured by market capitalization).
Second, finding significant coefficients on EPUt would be a weak test that our
mechanism is at work. Of course, we cannot rule out other confounding factors
that might be correlated with policy uncertainty. However, finding that all stocks
do not vary at all with changes in EPUt would tell us that our mechanism is not
at work, which, perhaps, would be interesting in its own right.
9Specifically, we use 690 firms rather than the 556 used in the Fama-French CAPM.
10More specifically, a dummy for whether the firm has positive foreign income.
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Identifying Assumptions
It should be noted that we are making several assumptions here. First, we are
assuming that there is one (correct) distribution of all economic and policy-related
parameters, a belief shared by all agents in the economy. As a result of this, the
changes in the volatility of policy shocks are assumed to be identical for savers
operating in financial markets as they are for firm owners deciding on input use.
Second, we are effectively assuming that the correlation between policy and
productivity does not change for any specific firm during the entire sample period.
We see how this might be a problematic assumption that, as beliefs about the
variance of policy are changing, beliefs about the correlation between policy and
productivity are held constant. However, this might not be as crazy as it sounds
if one buys that said correlation is determined by fundamental relations between
the government and a given sector, whereas policy uncertainty is driven by more
ephemeral swings in public opinion or current events.
Another way to address this assumption is that we are measuring the average
parameter over a number of period-specific parameters in our entire sample period.
Of course, we are also holding other moments of policy constant over the sample
period. If, say, swings in policy uncertainty were to be correlated with swings
in one particular direction of“mean” government policy, this would obfuscate our
empirical results.
3.4.3. Results
As we mention in section 3.4.2, one of our main interests is in looking at how policy
uncertainty β’s vary by three classifications: by sector, by multinational status,
and by size. In order to interpret these results, it might be useful to know that the
standard deviation of EPU over our sample period was 32.6. Policy uncertainty
jumps after big, unexpected events. For instance, after the 9/11 attacks the EPU
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Test Naked CAPM Fama-French CAPM
All sectors identical < 0.001 < 0.001
Local = Multinational 0.1415 0.1565
Small = Big 0.9625 < 0.001
All sectors identical (oil) 0.0406 < 0.001
All sectors identical (health) < 0.001 < 0.001
All sectors identical (reduced) < 0.001 < 0.001
Table (3.1) Tests of the null hypothesis that all β’s are equal to each other in several specifica-
tions.
index increased by 103.7711; after the 2016 election, it increased by 76.8612. Figure
C.1 in the data appendix graphs the EPU index during our sample period.
We can reject the null hypothesis that all individual firm β’s are zero with
more than 99.9% confidence. In all the categorizations below, we can also always
reject the null hypothesis that all category-level β’s are zero, again with confidence
higher than 99.9%. We can also usually reject the null hypothesis that all β’s are
equal to each other. More details about this are provided in Table 3.1.
Figure 3.1 reports sector-level policy beta’s for both models. Interestingly, it
appears that three sectors in particular tend to have higher returns in periods of
high policy uncertainty, indicating their productivity is negatively correlated with
policies harming their profits: Consumer Discretionary, which includes products
like cars, other durables, and services; Consumer Staples, which includes food, bev-
erages and tobacco, and household products; and Utilities, which includes electric
and gas utilities, as well as renewable electricity producers. On the other hand,
the energy sector, composed mostly of oil and gas manufacturers, tends to have
lower returns in periods of high policy uncertainty, indicating that policies that
decrease their profits tend to be implemented during periods that would otherwise
be very advantageous for them.
Figure 3.2 illustrates results for the classification by multinational status.
For both the naked and the Fama-French CAPM we cannot reject the null that
the effect is the same for multinational and domestic companies. For the naked
11From 84.29 in August 2001, to 188.06 in September 2001.



















































































































Figure (3.1) Mean βip’s by sector (95% CI)
CAPM, the p-value for the test that the effect is the same is 0.1415, while for
the Fama-French CAPM it is 0.1565. It should be noted that firms classified as
“multinationals” here are the ones that had any foreign income in a given year.
Given the heavy selection of “successfull” firms into our sample, the vast majority
of our observations – over 90% – is constituted by multinational companies. While
our estimates here are mostly statistically insignificant, they do go in the direction
that one would expect, with policy uncertainty in the U.S. being generally worse
for companies that earn all of their income domestically.
Finally, figure 3.3 represents mean beta’s for small and big firms. “Small”
here means a firm was in the smallest quintile of market capitalizations for a given
year, while “big” means they were in the highest quintile. While we can reject the
null hypothesis that EPU is uncorrelated with the return of firms of all sizes with
very high confidence (> 99.9%), we cannot always reject the hypothesis that the
result is identical for small and big firms. While in the naked CAPM the p-value
for the test that small and big firms have the same average β’s is 0.9625, we can
reject the null with very high confidence in the Fama-French model. This makes
sense given that in the Fama-French CAPM equation we are already accounting







































Figure (3.2) Mean βip’s by multinational status (95% CI). A company is classified as a “multi-
national” whenever it has positive foreign income.
founding results in the naked CAPM. In the Fama-French specification, we can
see that the returns of big firms tend to benefit from policy uncertainty, whereas
the returns of small firms tend to suffer. This is consistent with our prior that big
firms can pull more weight politically to obtain a policy environment that is more
favourable to them.
Figure 3.2 illustrates results for the classification by multinational status. For
both the naked and the Fama-French CAPM we cannot reject the null that the ef-
fect is the same for multinational and domestic companies. For the naked CAPM,
the p-value for the test that the effect is the same is 0.1415, while for the Fama-
French CAPM it is 0.1565. It should be noted that firms classified as “multina-
tionals” here are the ones that had any foreign income in a given year. Given
the heavy selection of “successfull” firms into our sample, the vast majority of our
observations – over 90% – is constituted by multinational companies. While our
estimates here are mostly statistically insignificant, they do go in the direction
that one would expect, with policy uncertainty in the U.S. being generally worse

































Figure (3.3) Mean βip’s by size (95% CI). “Small” means in the lowest quintile of market cap,
























































































































































Figure (3.5) News mean βip’s by multinational status (95% CI). A company is classified as a
































Figure (3.6) News mean βip’s by size (95% CI). “Small” means in the lowest quintile of market
cap, “big” means in the highest quintile.
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3.4.4. Alternative Measures
Because of concerns over how confounding factors might be weakening our anal-
ysis, we are thinking about new measures of policy uncertainty that might not
present the same problems. One possibility is to use “Google Trends” data on
search intensity for particular keywords. The idea is that this would allow us to
get more specific measures of uncertainty in policy relevant to certain sectors. We
attempt a first pass at this approach by looking at Google searches for “oil drilling”
and “healthcare”. Figures C.2 and C.2 depict graphical representations of these
variables in the data appendix. Searches for oil drilling spike once in 2008, when
the Bush administration lifted a ban on offshore drilling, and again during the
summer of 2010, during the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico; searches for healthcare
tend to be high throughout the Obamacare debate.
Results are presented by sector in figures 3.7 and 3.8. What we’d expect to see
here is that these two measures will be relevant for two particular sectors (respec-
tively, Energy and Health Care), and that they preserve the sign of the coefficient
found on EPU . Instead, we find quite the opposite. In both cases, the sector
of interest seems to be insensitive to its associated measure of uncertainty. We
believe this might be due to the fact that these measures are even more sensitive
to confounding factors. The Gulf spill in 2010 certainly did not represent a “mean




































































































































































































































Figure (3.8) Google Trends: “healthcare”. Mean βip’s by sector (95% CI)
Another thing that might be affecting results is that Google Trends are only
available starting in 2004, so the new analysis are effectively using a different
sample period. To address this concern, we run the specification with EPU on the
reduced sample. As we can see in figure 3.9, our results do not drastically change






















































































































Figure (3.9) GT reduced sample with EPU. Mean βip’s by sector (95% CI)
3.5. Conclusion
The question of how policy uncertainty affects investment has been raised in eco-
nomics long ago. In this chapter, we show how the classical result that the de-
ductibility of expenses leaves the choice of input undistorted is not valid whenever
tax policy is correlated with other uncertain determinants of input productivity.
Such a correlation might be induced by the tax system itself, or might arise due
to how the political process reacts to changes in productivity.
Our theoretical model considers an arbitrary tax system and shows that when-
ever there is a covariance between the determinants of the firm pre-tax productivity
and its marginal tax rate, this will act as an implicit tax on investment. This tax
can discourage investment, if the covariance is positive; but it can also encourage
investment (i.e., act as a subsidy), if the covariance is negative. The intuitive
mechanism at work here is strikingly simple, and really can be boiled down to the
numerical example we provided in the introduction: it is bad for expected profits
if taxes are high precisely when times are bountiful.
In our empirical work, we use stock market data to see how returns on different
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firms react to jumps in policy uncertainty, and then use this relationship to infer
the sign of the correlation between their productivity and tax policy. We do this
not only to give suggestive evidence that our mechanism is at work, but also to
document how different correlations are related to other firm characteristics.
We find that firms in the energy sector tend to be harmed by policy uncer-
tainty, while firms in consumer-related activities tend to benefit from it. This
is suggestive evidence that government policy tends to crack down on companies
when times are good in the former, and when times are bad in the latter. One
possible explanation for this could be that technological discoveries that make oil
and gas companies more productive (like, say, fracking) tend to be accompanied
by crackdowns on drilling regulations.
In conclusion, this chapter studies how a firm behaves when it faces uncertainty
regarding both its tax bill and the productivity of its inputs. Given our prelim-
inary results, we have reason to believe that this carries significant consequences
for a number of classical results in the economics of business taxation.
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APPENDIX A
Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1. Theoretical Foundations
In the theoretical framework that lays the ground for my empirical analysis, firm
i’s value originates from two different sources, Vi1 and Vi2. In what follows, I give
an example of a setting that would generate such a scenario.
Let us begin begin with a simple model of Cournot oligopoly. There are N
identical firms indexed by i, each producing quantity qi. They face an inverse
aggregate demand p(Q), where Q =
∑N
i=1 qi. Each firm picks how much to produce
to maximize profits, taking the output of the other firms, Q−i =
∑
j 6=i qj, as given:
max
qi≥0
(1− τ)(p(qi +Q−i)qi − c(qi)),
where c(qi) is the cost function and τ ∈ (0, 1) is the corporate tax rate. Let q∗(N)
denote the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of this game, and respectively define equi-
librium pre-tax profits π(N) ≡ p(Nq∗(N))q∗(N) − c(q∗(N)). Now let us imagine
an infinitely repeated version of the same game. Since q∗(N) is the equilibrium of
the stage-game, it must also be an equilibrium of the repeated game, so assume
that firms simply play q∗(N) every period. If future earnings are discounted at
rate r, then the equilibrium value of a firm is, at any point in time, (1−τ)π(N)
r
.
Now imagine that each firm operates in two unrelated markets, each a copy
of the one described above. In the first market, new firms can enter as long as





This condition implicitly defines the equilibrium number of firms, N1(τ). Letting













Since ce is an exogenous constant, this makes it immediately evident that V1 will
not change upon a change in τ – in the language of section 3.3, we are in a
case where α = 1. We could also imagine a version of this same model where
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entry is limited. Say, for example, as long as (1−τ)π(N1)
r
> ce, one firm can enter
every period. Depending on the length of the period and the discounting between
periods, we will obtain positive values of α: the longer each entrant has to wait,
and the more valued the present is relative to the future, the higher the implied
value of α.
In the second market, instead, let us suppose that the number of firms is given
and constant at N2, say thanks to the presence of intellectual property rights or












A.2. Summary Statistics and Descriptive
Graphs
Variable Mean S.D. 25th percentile Median 75th percentile
Excess return (%) 0.09 3.53 -0.879 -0.001 0.969
Abnormal return (%) 0.009 3.49 -0.894 -0.019 0.813
Market Cap (billion USD) 6.54 26.33 0.15 0.76 3.188634
Lerner index (2016) -10.74 235.7 -84.24 0.088 0.207
Market share (2016) .018 .063 0.0001 0.001 0.009
Herfindahl index (2016) .093 0.9 0.032 0.059 0.125
Proportion of foreign profits (2016) 0.137 2.499 0 0 0.06
τ̄FORi (2016) 0.072 1.34 0 0 0.01
Table (A.1) Summary statistics of firm fundamentals. Note that the Lerner Index as well as
the proportion of foreign profits and the average foreign tax rate can be negative because they
are fractions whose numerator (and in some cases whose denominator) can be negative in the
data. For instance, about a third of firms on Compustat report operating losses. The Lerner
index will be negative for those firms.
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A.2.1. Data on the bet asking “Will the corporate tax
rate be cut by the end of 2017?”
Figure (A.1) Average price of a “Buy Yes” contract.
Figure (A.2) Average, low, and high prices.
Figure (A.3) Number of contracts exchanged.
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Figure (A.4) Number of individual bettors.
A.2.2. Data on the best asking “Will the corporate tax
rate be cut by March 31, 2018?”
Figure (A.5) Average price of a “Buy Yes” contract.
Figure (A.6) Average, low, and high prices.
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Figure (A.7) Number of contracts exchanged.
Figure (A.8) Number of individual bettors.
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A.3. Date-by-date Results
Dependent variable: abnormal returns
Coefficient estimate of:
· · · × . . . Market Cap HHI × s Lerner
September 27 0.0032∗∗∗ -0.0792 0.0006309∗∗∗
(0.00007) (0.0567) (.0000241)
November 2 0.0012∗∗∗ 0.2177∗∗∗ 0.0001389∗∗∗
(0.00007) (0.0567) (.0000241)
November 16 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.3791∗∗∗ -0.0000397
(0.00007) (0.0567) (.0000241)
December 2 0.0003∗∗∗ 3.3104∗∗∗ -0.0000542∗∗
(0.00007) (0.0566) (.0000241)
December 15 0.0021∗∗∗ 0.9912∗∗∗ 0.0002194∗∗∗
(0.00007) (0.0567) (.0000241)
December 20 -0.0004∗∗∗ 0.5666∗∗∗ 0.0008203∗∗∗
(0.00007) (0.0567) (.0000241)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Foreign Profits Controls Yes Yes Yes
N 296,437 1,274,778 1,166,039
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table (A.2) Each column corresponds to an estimation of equation 1.3 with each one of our
three measures of productivity and market power, disaggregated by date. Standard errors, in
parentheses, are clustered by day.
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A.4. Alternative Asset Pricing Models
A.4.1. Raw Excess Returns
In this case, there is no asset model. Simply, Ri,t−Rft replaces ARi,t in specification
1.3.




HHI× market share 0.0834
(0.260)




Lerner index ×TCJA dates 0.000283∗∗
(0.000133)
Proportion of foreign profits -0.00123 -0.00143∗
(0.000808) (0.000806)
Proportion of foreign profits ×TCJA dates -0.00810 -0.00820
(0.00636) (0.00609)
Avg. for. tax rate -0.000776 -0.000865
(0.00166) (0.00164)
Avg. for. tax rate ×TCJA dates 0.0208 0.0216
(0.0145) (0.0139)
N 1,274,778 1,166,039
Industry FE Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table (A.3) Continuous diff-in-diff regressions of raw excess returns. Standard errors, in paren-

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Now, abnormal returns are being computed using the following asset pricing model:
Rit = αi + βiR
m
t + εi (A.1)




HHI× market share 0.0116
(0.266)




Lerner index ×TCJA dates 0.000294∗∗
(0.000130)
Proportion of foreign profits -0.000346 -0.000459
(0.000815) (0.000813)
Proportion of foreign profits ×TCJA dates -0.00919 -0.00926
(0.00595) (0.00573)
Avg. for. tax rate 0.000338 0.000315
(0.00165) (0.00164)
Avg. for. tax rate ×TCJA dates 0.0195 0.0205
(0.0139) (0.0133)
N 1,274,778 1,166,039
Industry FE Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table (A.5) Continuous diff-in-diff regressions of abnormal returns, computed using equation



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Now, abnormal returns are being computed using the following asset pricing model:
Rit −Rft = βi(Rmt −R
f
t ) + εi (A.2)




HHI× market share 0.274
(0.266)




Lerner index ×TCJA dates 0.000294∗∗
(0.000131)
Proportion of foreign profits -0.00145∗ -0.00168∗∗
(0.000814) (0.000813)
Proportion of foreign profits ×TCJA dates -0.00923 -0.00925
(0.00596) (0.00573)
Avg. for. tax rate -0.00118 -0.00128
(0.00165) (0.00164)
Avg. for. tax rate ×TCJA dates 0.0194 0.0204
(0.0139) (0.0133)
N 1,274,778 1,166,039
Industry FE Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table (A.7) Continuous diff-in-diff regressions of abnormal returns, computed using equation



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A.4.4. 5-Factor Fama-French Model
Now, abnormal returns are being computed using the following asset pricing model:
Ri,t −Rft = βmi (Rmt −R
f
t ) + β
HML
i HMLt (A.3)
+ βSMBi SMBt + β
RMW
i RMWt + β
CMA
i CMAt + ui,t,
where the two additional factors RMW (Robust Minus Weak) and CMA (Conser-
vative Minus Aggressive) represent respectively the premium on robust relative to
weak operating profitability portfolios and the premium on conservative relative
to aggressive investment portfolios.




HHI× market share 0.297
(0.206)




Lerner index ×TCJA dates 0.000212
(0.000176)
Proportion of foreign profits -0.00156∗ -0.00180∗∗
(0.000827) (0.000825)
Proportion of foreign profits ×TCJA dates -0.00667 -0.00654
(0.00567) (0.00541)
Avg. for. tax rate -0.00111 -0.00124
(0.00162) (0.00161)
Avg. for. tax rate ×TCJA dates 0.0122 0.0143
(0.0129) (0.0125)
N 1,274,778 1,166,039
Industry FE Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table (A.9) Continuous diff-in-diff regressions of abnormal returns, computed using equation


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A.5. Robustness Checks Regarding
Specification 1.3
A.5.1. “Parallel Trends”
In the absence of a subsample that is not affected by the corporate tax cut (which
is, of course, impossible to obtain in a sample of publicly traded corporations) one
cannot run a true parallel trends robustness test for the main diff-in-diff speci-
fication in equation 1.3. Instead, what follows shows that the coefficient on the
interaction between different measures of Mi and each individual date tends to
move with changes in the betting prices. Because stock market prices should fol-
low a random walk, and because innovations in contract price should be exogenous,
these results suggest that the results obtained using our 6 dates of interest are at
least not entirely spurious.
Figure (A.9) How the coefficient on Market Cap. and date dummies changes with ∆P . Corre-
lation between the two series is 0.207.
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Figure (A.10) How the coefficient on HHI×s and date dummies changes with ∆P . Correlation
between the two series is 0.2372.
Figure (A.11) How the coefficient on L and date dummies changes with ∆P . Correlation
between the two series is 0.0579.
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A.5.2. No Industry Fixed Effects
Here I show results of specification 1.3 without industry fixed effects.




HHI× market share 0.210
(0.129)




Lerner index ×TCJA dates 0.000286∗∗
(0.000137)
Proportion of foreign profits -0.00111 -0.00139∗
(0.000809) (0.000802)
Proportion of foreign profits ×TCJA dates -0.00604 -0.00557
(0.00588) (0.00575)
Avg. for. tax rate -0.000613 -0.000835
(0.00158) (0.00157)
Avg. for. tax rate ×TCJA dates 0.0154 0.0173
(0.0133) (0.0127)
N 1,274,778 1,166,039
Industry FE No No
Time FE Yes Yes
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table (A.11) Continuous diff-in-diff regressions of abnormal returns, without industry fixed





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A.6. Hernfindahl-Hirschmann Index in
Manufacturing
While the market shares (and resulting measurements of HHI) are computed using
only Compustat data. This runs the risk of omitting potentially relevant competi-
tors in each market which are not publicly traded and thus not on Compustat.
The U.S. Census data provides concentration data by NAICS code, but unfortu-
nately only for manufacturing sectors. If we repeat the analysis using these data,
we obtain the following estimates:
Dependent Variable: Abnormal Returns
Market share -0.0178 -0.00228
(0.0179) (0.00600)
HHI× market share 0.142 -0.000666
(0.132) (0.0389)
HHI× market share ×TCJA dates 0.116 0.119
(0.202) (0.202)
Proportion of foreign profits -0.000481 -0.000828
(0.00106) (0.000994)
Proportion of foreign profits ×TCJA dates -0.0114 -0.0114
(0.0110) (0.0110)
Avg. for. tax rate -0.00222 -0.000856
(0.00261) (0.00257)
Avg. for. tax rate ×TCJA dates 0.0128 0.0121
(0.0195) (0.0196)
N 452,163 452,163
Industry FE Yes No
Time FE Yes Yes
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table (A.13) Continuous diff-in-diff regressions of abnormal returns. Market shares and HHI
computed using Census data on the manufacturing sector. Standard errors, in parentheses, are
clustered by day.
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A.7. Robustness Checks Regarding the
Distribution of Excess Returns by Firm
Figure (A.12) Distribution of excess returns due to six random dates aroung August 2017. The
specific dates picked for this regression were July 31, 2017; August 8, 2017; August 16, 2017;
August 23, 2017; August 25, 2017;and September 4, 2017.
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APPENDIX B
Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1. Additional Results and Proofs
B.1.1. Additional results and proofs from section 2.2
Proposition 2. Suppose we can extend u to R2 such that u is continuous and
quasi-concave. Then for any p̄, pNT , τ , and W on which q is defined, there exist
scalar values ps and W s such that:
q(p̄, pNT , τ,W ) ∈ arg max
psq+pNT qNT≤W s
u(q, qNT )
q(p̄, pNT , τ,W s) ∗ (p̄+ τ, pNT ) = W
We demonstrate a generalization of proposition 2, in which multiple goods
may be taxed. We consider a general setting with N goods, consumption set
X = XT × XNT ⊆ RN+ , with consumption vector q = (qT , qNT ) ∈ X. Here XT
is the consumption set for taxed goods, while XNT is the consumption set for
non-taxed goods. We assume that either XNT ⊆ R+ or XNT is convex.
The agent has preferences  on X. Informally, we want to assume preferences
such that agents smoothly prefer moderation. To say that they prefer moderation,
one generally assumes convex preferences. However, we do not want to assume a
convex consumption set X. We might alternatively assume that preferences are
pseudo-convex, in that for any q ∈ X and any finite n:










However, we also want some smoothness to preferences. More formally, we want
to figure that if q′  q, then there is an epsilon ball around q′ such that the agent
would prefer any element in that epsilon ball to q if that element were also in the
consumption set. Furthermore, any convex combination of points in these epsilon
balls should yield a point that, if contained in X, is also strictly preferred to q.
We refer to this assumption on preferences as continuous pseudo-convexity (CPC).
Assumption 2. For any q ∈ X, define the set of strictly preferred allocations:
A ≡ {q′ ∈ X|q′  q}
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There exists some function ε : A → R++ such that for any n ∈ N, for any
λ1, ..., λn ≥ 0 and q1, ..., qn ∈ A, if
∑n
k=1 λk = 1, then :









We provide this description of CPC preferences to facilitate intuition, but our
main result for this section comes from an equivalent, yet more geometric, expres-
sion of this description.
Lemma 1. Preferences  are CPC if and only if for every q ∈ X with correspond-
ing set of strictly preferred bundles A there is an open and convex set O ⊆ RN
such that O ∩X = A.1
Proof : For one direction, the convex hull of the union of open ε(q′) balls around
q′ ∈ A is open, and by assumption does not contain any elements of X \ A. For
the other direction, for any q′ ∈ A, define ε(q′) as a positive value such that
q′′ ∈ RN+ : ||q′′ − q′|| < ε(q′)⇒ q′′ ∈ O. We can do so because O is open. For any
such q′′, if q′′ ∈ X, then q′′  q.
Let p = (pT ,pNT ) ∈ RN+ denote a generic price vector, where pT and pNT
are price vectors for taxed and non-taxed goods respectively. In particular, let
p̄ = (p̄T , p̄NT ) denote the vector of sticker prices.
Let τ denote the vector of taxes for taxed goods, so that qT , qNT , and
τ all have the same number of elements. The consumption vector q(p̄, τ ) =
(qT (p̄, τ ), qNT (p̄, τ )) satisfies the following properties:
p̄NT ∗ q̃NT ≤ W − p̄T ∗ qT
(qT , q̃NT )  (qT , q̂NT ) ∀q̂NT ∈ XNT : p̄NT ∗ q̃NT ≤ W − p̄T ∗ qT
q(p̄,0) ∈ arg max
q̃∈X:p̄∗q̃≤W

In words, consumption of the non-taxed goods is always optimally determined
upon choosing consumption of the taxed goods, and consumption is optimally
determined when the agent correctly perceives prices, i.e. when there are no taxes.
We also restrict the domain of sticker prices and taxes so that expenditure on non-
taxed goods is positive, i.e.:
p̄NT ∗ qNT (p̄, τ ) > 0
The claim is that for any p̄ and τ in this domain, there is a (ps,W s) that explains
q(p̄, τ ).
Proof of Generalization of Proposition 2 : Define q = (qT , qNT ) = q(p̄, τ ) and:
Ae ≡ {(qT ′, eNT ′)|qT ′ ∈ XT ,∃qNT ′ ∈ XNT : p̄NT ∗ qNT ′ = eNT ′ , (qT ′ , qNT ′) ∈ O}
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that (qT , p̄NT ∗ qNT ) ∈ Co(Ae), i.e. that
1Note that O is open in RN .
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∃n ∈ N, (qTk , eNTk ) ∈ Ae, and λk ≥ 0 ∀k = 1, ..., n such that
∑n







k ) = (q
T , p̄NT ∗ qNT )
Since (qTk , e
NT
k ) ∈ Ae ∀k, that means that:
∀k ∃qNTk : eNTk = p̄NT ∗ qNTk , qk ≡ (qTk , qNTk )⇒ qk ∈ O
If XNT ⊆ R+, then
∑n
k=1 λkp̄





qNT because positive non-tax expenditure requires that p̄NT 6= 0. In that case:
n∑
k=1




This is a contradiction arising from q /∈ O.
If XNT is not a subset of R+, then XNT is convex. This means
∑n
k=1 λkqk ∈ X.




Yet the weighted average of taxed goods is the desired taxed good consumption















Thus, the agent could not have optimally chosen qNT , another contradiction. We
conclude that (qT , p̄NT ∗ qNT ) /∈ Co(Ae).
Now, we can apply the Separating Hyperplane Theorem to say that there is a
vector (pTs, 1), where pTs has as many elements as qT , such that:
(pTs, 1) ∗ (qT , p̄NT ∗ qNT ) ≤ (pTs, 1) ∗ (qT ′ , eNT ′) ∀(qT ′ , eNT ′) ∈ Co(Ae)
Defining ps ≡ (pTs, p̄NT ), this implies that for any bundle q′ = (qT ′ , qNT ′) ∈ O:
ps ∗ q′ ≥ ps ∗ q
Since O is open, the above expression can never be satisfied with equality. To see
this, suppose otherwise, i.e. that ∃q′ ∈ O such that:
ps ∗ q′ = ps ∗ q
Note that p̄NT > 0 implies that we can choose q′′ within ε(q′) of q′ by slightly
reducing a component of q′ for which the corresponding perceived price is positive.
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Thus, q′′ ∈ O, yet ps∗q′′ < ps∗q. This yields our desired contradiction. Therefore:
ps ∗ q′ > ps ∗ q ∀q′ ∈ O
We conclude by defining W s ≡ ps ∗ q and noting that ∀q′ ∈ X:
q′  q ⇒ q′ ∈ O ⇒ ps > W s
Therefore, the model has rationalized consumption because no preferred consump-
tion bundle is perceived to be affordable.
Now that we’ve gone through the proof, we can make a couple of observa-
tions. One, the assumption of CPC preferences is satisfied when preferences are
represented by a lower semi-continuous and quasi-concave function u on RN , so
that:
∀x, y ∈ X : x  y ⇔ u(x) ≥ u(y)
This makes it clear that we have, in fact, generalized proposition 2. Also, note
that it may be easier in practice to check to see that preferences have such a utility
representation than to check that they satisfy continuous pseudo-convexity.
Two, it may appear strange that we needed to assume that XNT is concave
specifically if it has dimension greater than one. This is because a discrete grid
for consumption of non-taxed goods can create a lumpy evaluation of non-tax
expenditure, thwarting the existence of a separating hyperplane. For example,
consider a consumption set R+ × {0, 1}2, where there is one taxed good chosen
continuously and two non-taxed goods chosen from {0, 1}. The sticker price vector
is p̄ = (1, 1, 1). The consumer have preferences rationalized by the function:
u(q) = q1 + min{q2, q3}
In words, the taxed good is perfect substitutes with the minimum consumption of
the two non-taxed goods, which are perfect complements with each other. Consider
the consumption bundle:
q = (0, 1, 0)
If the agent perceived income W s ≥ 2, they could do better by consuming (0, 1, 1).
Supposing otherwise, if the agent perceives a positive tax-inclusive price of the
taxed good, then optimally q1 > 0 and q2 = q3 = 0. Finally, there is no optimal
consumption bundle if ps1 ≤ 0. Thus, the consumption bundle cannot be rational-
ized.
Next, we derive our expression for the change in consumer surplus due to the
tax:
Proposition 3. Let e(p) and h(p) denote the expenditure function and compen-
sated demand for the taxed good respectively at price p for the taxed good and price
pNT for the other good, so that the agent is minimally compensated so as to achieve
utility of at least u(q(p̄, pNT , 0,W )); formally,
e(p) = min{W ′|u(d(p, pNT ,W ′), dNT (p, pNT ,W )) ≥ u(q(p̄, pNT , 0,W ))},
which is well-defined by continuity of u and connectedness of the choice set. Then
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compensating variation due to the tax satisfies:
∆CS = (p̄+ τ − ps)h(ps) + e(ps)− e(p̄) (B.1)
Proof : LettingW s denote conjectured wealth when facing tax τ , local non-satiation
of preferences implies that:
(ps, p̄NT ) ∗ q(p̄, pNT , τ,W + ∆CS) = W s = e(ps)
In words, total perceived expenditures equal perceived wealth, which must be ex-
actly the wealth the agent would need under perceived prices to achieve the utility
from before the tax. Plugging in and using the fact that h(ps) = q(p̄, pNT , τ,W +
∆CS) yields:
(p̄+ τ − ps)h(ps) = [(p̄+ τ, p̄NT )− (ps, p̄NT )] ∗ q(p̄, τ,W + ∆CS)
(p̄+ τ − ps)h(ps) = W + ∆CS − e(ps)
Rearranging and again using local non-satiation yields:
∆CS = e(ps)−W + (p̄+ τ − ps)h(ps) = e(ps)− e(p̄) + (p̄+ τ − ps)h(ps)
The following lemma establishes the Compensated Law of Demand (CLD) in
our setting:
Lemma 2. For any agent i with type θi and any two prices p and p
′:
p < p′ ⇒ q(p′; θi, h) ≤ q(p; θi, l)
Proof : Note that there must be values qNT and qNT
′
such that:
(q(p; θi, l), q




p ∗ q(p; θi, l) + pNT ∗ qNT ≤ p ∗ q(p′; θi, h) + pNT ∗ qNT
′
p′ ∗ q(p′; θi, h) + pNT ∗ qNT
′ ≤ p′ ∗ q(p; θi, l) + pNT ∗ qNT
Rearranging yields:
p ∗ [q(p; θi, l)− q(p′; θi, h)] ≤ pNT ∗ [qNT
′ − qNT ] ≤ p′ ∗ [q(p; θi, l)− q(p′; θi, h)]
Thus, p′ > p⇒ q(p; θi, l) ≥ q(p′; θi, h).
Proposition 4. Assume a continuously differentiable and strictly increasing ag-
gregate supply function Qsupply, as well as continuously differentiable compensated
demand functions hi and subjective price functions p
s
i ∀i. Subjective price functions
change one-for-one with sticker prices, so that:
psi (p̄, τ) = p̄+ p
s
i (0, τ) ∀p̄ ∀τ ∀i
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Subjective prices also agree with sticker prices when there is no tax:
psi (p̄, 0) = p̄ ∀p̄ ∀i
































qci ≡ hi(psi (p̄new, τ), νi) ∀i


































(p̄new − psi (p̄new, τ))qci
Note that p̄new is a function of τ . One can easily confirm that p̄new|τ=0 = p̄old,


















































2νi ≡ ui(di(p,Wi)) ∀i
3Note that p̄new ≤ p̄old ∀τ ≥ 0 from the Compensated Law of Demand and the fact that
supply is strictly increasing in price.
4This claim also uses the fact that aggregate supply is strictly increasing while aggregate
compensated demand is weakly decreasing, so that there is always a unique value for p̄new.
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Obtaining the second derivative would be straightforward if hi ∈ C2 ∀i. In-























Note that continuity of
∂psi
∂τ





































































































Now we can find the second order approximation for deadweight loss:

































B.1.2. Additional results and proofs from section 2.3
The upper and lower bounds use the following lemma:
Lemma 3. For any agent i with type θi and any two pairs (p, ζi) and (p
′, ζ ′i):
dwl(p′; θi, ζi) ≥ dwl(p; θi, ζ ′i)− (p− p̄)(q(p′; θi, ζ ′i)− q(p; θi, ζi)).
Proof : Note from the definition of the expenditure function and optimal com-
pensated consumption vectors q and q′ for price vectors (p, pNT ) and (p′, pNT )
respectively:
e(p′)−e(p) = (p′, pNT )∗q′−(p, pNT )∗q ≥ (p′, pNT )∗q′−(p, pNT )∗q′ = (p′−p)q(p′; θi, ζ ′i)
Plugging in yields:
dwl(p′; θi) = [e(p
′)− e(p̄)]− (p′ − p̄)q(p′; θi, ζ ′i)
= [e(p′)− e(p)] + [e(p)− e(p̄)]− [(p′ − p) + (p− p̄)]q(p′; θi, ζ ′i)
≥ (p′ − p)q(p′; θi, ζ ′i) + e(p)− e(p̄)− [(p′ − p) + (p− p̄)]q(p′; θi, ζ ′i)
= e(p)− e(p̄)− (p− p̄)q(p′; θi, ζ ′i)
= dwl(p) + (p− p̄)q(p; θi, ζi)− (p− p̄)q(p′; θi, ζ ′i)
= dwl(p; θi)− (p− p̄)(q(p′; θi, ζ ′i)− q(p; θi, ζi))




















(b) p′ > p
Figure (B.1) A graphical illustration of Lemma 3. As long as demand is weakly decreasing,
dwl(p′) cannot be smaller than dwl(p) minus (plus) the orange rectangle.
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Proof of Proposition 1 : From lemma 2 and prices being bound away from zero,
we can always find a value of p̂s such that:∫
θi
q(p̂s; θi, l)dFθ(θi) ≤
∫
psi ,θi,ζi
q(psi ; θi, ζi)dFps,θ,ζ(p
s











q(p̂s; θi, l)dFθ(θi) =
∫
psi ,θi,ζi
q(psi ; θi, ζi)dFps,θ,ζ(p
s
i , θi, ζi)
Define F ′θ,ζ such that F
′
θ = Fθ and ζ = h with probability λ, ζ = l with probability
1− λ, θ ⊥ ζ. Then:∫
θi,ζi
q(p̂s; θi, ζi)dFθ(θi) =
∫
θi




q(plsi ; θi, ζi)dF
′
ps,θ,ζ(θi, ζi)
Proof of theorem 1 : From lemma 3:∫
psi ,θi,ζi
[dwl(psi ; θi, ζi)+(p̂




[dwl(p̂s; θi, ζi) + (p̂
s − p̄)q(p̂s; θi, ζi)]dF ′θ,ζ(θi, ζi)




q(psi ; θi, ζi)dFps,θ,ζ(p
s







We can thus conclude that:∫
psi ,θi,ζi
dwl(psi ; θi, ζi)dFps,θ,ζ(p
s
i , θi, ζi) ≥
∫
θi,ζi
dwl(p̂s; θi, ζi)dFθ,ζ(θi, ζi)
122
Proof of theorem 2 : From lemma 3 and rationalizability of the data:∫
psi ,θi
[dwl(pb(psi ); θi) + (p
s




[dwl(psi ; θi) + (p
s
i − p̄)q(psi ; θi, ζi)]dFps,θ,ζ(psi , θi, ζi)
∫
psi ,θi
[dwl(pb(psi ); θi) + p
s
iq(p












i ; θi, ζi)]dFps,θ,ζ(p
s
i , θi, ζi)
∫
psi ,θi
[dwl(pb(psi ); θi, ζi) + (p
s




[dwl(psi ; θi) + (p
s
i − p̃s)q(psi ; θi, ζi)]dFps,θ,ζ(psi , θi, ζi)
Rearranging yields:∫
psi ,θi,ζi








dwl(psi ; θi, ζi)dFps,θ,ζ(p
s








(psi − p̃s)q(psi ; θi, ζi)dFps,θ,ζ(psi , θi, ζi)
We can show from lemma 2 and psi ∈ [p̄, p̄ + m̄τ ] = P ∀i that the term on the
second line is non-negative. Formally for any psi ∈ (p̄, p̄+ m̄τ), θi, ζi, ζ ′i:
psi > p̃
s ⇒ pb(psi ) > p̃s ⇒ q(pb(psi ); θi, ζ ′i) ≤ q(psi ; θi, ζi)
psi ≤ p̃s ⇒ pb(psi ) < p̃s ⇒ q(pb(psi ); θi, ζ ′i) ≥ q(psi ; θi, ζi)
Either way:
























(psi − p̃s)q(psi ; θi, ζi)dF ′′ps,θ,ζ(psi , θi, ζi)
∫
psi ,θi,ζi
dwl(pb(psi ); θi, ζi)dFps,θ(p
s
i , θi) ≥
∫
psi ,θi,ζi
dwl(psi ; θi, ζi)dFps,θ(p
s
i , θi, ζi)
Before stating and proving theorem 3, we note that deadweight loss is bounded
by the product of the reduction in demand and m̄τ .
Lemma 4. If psi ∈ [p̄, p̄+m̄τ ], then dwl(psi ; θi, ζi) ≤ [q(p̄; θi, ζi)−q(psi ; θi, ζi)]m̄τ ∀θi, ζi.
Proof : Using lemma 3:
0 = dwl(p̄; θi, ζi) ≥ dwl(psi ; θi, ζi)− (psi − p̄)[q(p̄; θi, ζi)− q(psi ; θi, ζi)]
dwl(psi ; θi, ζi) ≤ [q(p̄; θi, ζi)− q(psi ; θi, ζi)](psi − p̄) ≤ [q(p̄; θi, ζi)− q(psi ; θi, ζi)]m̄τ.
Next, we state and prove theorem 3. It says that the maximal value of dead-
weight loss consistent with the data and knowledge of F ∗θ is given by having some
agents perceive the highest possible price and some others perceive the lowest pos-
sible price. It achieves this by assigning the good there where it will generate the
most deadweight loss, while holding aggregate demand constant. The resulting
demand function, q̃∆,γ(θi), is such that those for whom the ratio of deadweight
loss5 to change in quantity exceeds ∆ perceive the highest price, those with such
a ratio below ∆ perceive the lowest possible price, and those with ratio equal to
∆ are split between perceiving the high and low price in a way that rationalizes
demand. Those who perceive the high (low) price consume the least (most) pos-
sible consistent with their perceptions.
5Note that when ps = p̄, the tax is effectively lump-sum and so there is no deadweight loss.
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dwl(p̄+ m̄τ ; θi, l)
q(p̄; θi, h)− q(p̄+ m̄τ ; θi, l)
> ∆) + γI(
dwl(p̄+ m̄τ ; θi, l)
q(p̄; θi, h)− q(p̄+ m̄τ ; θi, l)
= ∆)
]




dwl(p̄+ m̄τ ; θi, l)
q(p̄; θi, h)− q(p̄+ m̄τ ; θi, l)
< ∆) + (1− γ)I( dwl(p̄+ m̄τ ; θi, l)
q(p̄; θi, h)− q(p̄+ m̄τ ; θi, l)
= ∆)
]
× q(p̄; θi, h)
Of course, if q(p̄; θi, h) = q(p̄ + m̄τ ; θi, l), then q̃∆,γ(θi) = q(p̄; θi, h). Furthermore,




q̃∆,γ(θi)− q(p̄; θi, h)
q(p̄+ m̄τ ; θi, l)− q(p̄; θi, h)








dwl(psi ; θi, ζi)dFps,θ,ζ(p
s
i , θi, ζi)
where the integrand on the left-hand side is defined as zero for any θi such that
q(p̄+ m̄τ ; θi, l) = q(p̄; θi, h).
The intuition is for the ∆ term is straightforward. The econometrician observes
the reduction in aggregate demand due to the tax. In searching for the explanation
of that reduction in demand that maximizes deadweight loss, one should assign
the reduction in quantity demanded to those for whom that allocation yields the
greatest deadweight loss. Following this procedure, there is a cutoff value ∆ which
describes the amount of deadweight loss obtained relative to the reduction in quan-
tity demanded sufficient to warrant the assignment of subjective tax-inclusive price
psi = p̄+ m̄τ to that agent.
The idea behind the tie-breaking provision is that those individuals who per-
ceive the high price should reduce their consumption as much as possible to max-
imize deadweight loss; those who perceive the sticker price should maximize their
consumption to permit even more individuals to perceive the high price.
Proof of Theorem 3 : The outline of the proof is as follows. First, we use lemma
4 to show that the maximal deadweight loss consistent with aggregate demand
and F ∗θ comes from a data-generating process in which agents perceiving the
price p̄ + m̄τ choose the lowest quantity consistent with preference maximiza-
tion, whereas the other agents choose the largest such quantity. Then, we show
that distributions satisfying such a property yield deadweight loss no larger than
the proposed distribution, which exists.
First, consider an arbitrary distribution Fps,θ,ζ (yielding well-defined aggregate
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0 psi < p̄
Fps(p̄) p
s
i ∈ [p̄, p̄+ m̄τ)
1 psi ≥ p̄+ m̄τ
In words, the above expression says that the support of ps is contained in {p̄, p̄+
m̄τ}. By theorem 2, the maximal value of deadweight loss consistent with aggre-












q(psi ; θi, ζi)dFps,θ,ζ(p
s
i , θi, ζi)
(B.2)
Such a value of ρ must exist by the Intermediate Value Theorem, since by the
definition of l and h and the CLD as expressed in lemma 2:∫
θi
q(p̄+ m̄τ ; θi, l)dFθ|ps 6=p̄(θi) ≤
∫
psi ,θi,ζi
q(psi ; θi, ζi)dFps,θ,ζ(p
s





In words, we are constructing an alternative distribution that rationalizes aggre-
gate demand such that ps = p̄ + m̄τ and ζ = l with probability ρ, and otherwise
ps = p̄ and ζ = h. We now show that this alternate distribution yields at least
as much deadweight loss, thus showing that the maximal value of deadweight loss
consistent with aggregate demand and F ∗θ must arise from a distribution in which
almost surely (ps, ζ) = (p̄, h) or (ps, ζ) = (p̄+ m̄τ, l).
From the definition of deadweight loss:∫
θi,ζi




[dwl(p̄+ m̄τ ; θi, l)− dwl(p̄; θi, ζi)]dFθ,ζ|ps 6=p̄
From here, the definition of l, and using the fact that dwl(p̄; θi, ζi) = 0 ∀θi, ζi, we
126



























dwl(p̄+ m̄τ ; θi, ζi)dFθ,ζ(θi, ζi)
Where the inequality follows from the fact that ρ ≥ 1 − Fps(p̄) by assumption,
and the fact that dwl(p̄ + m̄τ ; θi, ζi) and the definition of l. This shows that
whenever ρ ≥ 1 − Fps(p̄), the proposed alternative distribution yields at least as
much deadweight loss. Now suppose instead ρ < 1− Fps(p̄). From lemma 4:∫
θi,ζi




[q(p̄; θi, h)− q(p̄+ m̄τ ; θi, ζi)]m̄τdFθi,ζi|ps 6=p̄(θi, ζi)
In addition, we find it convenient to rewrite the aggregate demand-rationalizing
equation as: ∫
psi ,θi,ζi
q(psi ; θi, ζi)dFps,θ,ζ(p
s








q(p̄; θi, ζi)dFθ|ps=p̄(θi, ζi)









− [1− Fps(p̄)− ρ]
∫
θi,ζi




q(p̄+ m̄τ ; θi, ζi)dFθ,ζ|ps 6=p̄(θi, ζi)
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− [1− Fps(p̄)− ρ]
∫
θi,ζi






























+ [1− Fps(p̄)− ρ]m̄τ
∫
θi,ζi








dwl(p̄+ m̄τ ; θi, ζi)dFθ,ζ|ps 6=p̄(θi, ζi)
+ [1− Fps(p̄)− ρ]m̄τ
∫
θi,ζi








dwl(p̄; θi, ζi)dFθ,ζ|ps=p̄(θi, ζi)
Thus, we know that the maximal deadweight loss consistent with aggregate de-
mand and F ∗θ is generated by a distribution in which with probability one either
(ps, ζ) = (p̄, h) or (ps, ζ) = (p̄ + m̄τ, l). We refer to distributions of this sort as
binary distributions.
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Now, we show that the proposed distribution maximizes deadweight loss among
all binary distributions, and thus among all distributions, that rationalize aggre-
gate demand such that Fθ = F
∗
θ . Towards that end, we first show that the proposed






i , θi) ≤
∫
psi ,θi,ζi













In words, aggregate demand is contained between when all agents perceive a high
price and have type h and when all agents perceive a low price and have type l.
Furthermore, one can confirm that for any ∆,∆′, γ, γ′ such that 0 ≤ ∆ < ∆′ ≤ m̄τ

































i , θi) ≤
∫
psi ,θi,ζi













If both sides hold with equality, we can define γ arbitrarily. Otherwise, we define

























We now have the values ∆ and γ such that the market clears. Suppressing ∆ and






i , θi) =
∫
psi ,θi,ζi




i , θi, ζi)
Finally, to show that the proposed distribution maximizes deadweight loss,
consider arbitrary binary distribution Fps,θ,ζ that rationalizes aggregate demand.
Defining PF (ps 6= p̄|θi) ≡ 1 − Fps|θ=θi(p̄ + m̄τ) as the probability that (ps, ζ) =

















i , θi, ζi)
We can now write the difference in generated values of aggregate deadweight loss
as: ∫
θi
[ q̃(θi)− q(p̄; θi, h)
q(p̄+ m̄τ ; θi, l)− q(p̄; θi, h)
− PF (ps 6= p̄|θi)
]


























PF (ps 6= p̄|θi)[q(p̄; θi, h)− q(p̄+ m̄τ ; θi, l)]dF ∗θ (θi)
Where
X ≡ {θi : dwl(p̄+ m̄τ) > ∆[q(p̄; θi, h)− q(p̄+ m̄τ ; θi, l)]}
Y ≡ {θi : dwl(p̄+ m̄τ) = ∆[q(p̄; θi, h)− q(p̄+ m̄τ ; θi, l)]}
Z ≡ {θi : dwl(p̄+ m̄τ) < ∆[q(p̄; θi, h)− q(p̄+ m̄τ ; θi, l)]}
We complete the proof by showing the right-hand side of the last inequality is zero.
Since both distributions rationalize the same aggregate demand:∫
θi:X




































PF (ps 6= ps|θi) [q(p̄+ m̄τ ; θi, l)− q(p̄; θi, h)]dF ∗θ (θi)
Finally, subtracting the right-hand side from the left-hand size and multiplying by
zero yields the desired result. Thus:∫
θi
[ q̃(θi)− q(p̄; θi, h)
q(p̄+ m̄τ ; θi, l)− q(p̄; θi, h)
− PF (ps 6= p̄|θi)
]
dwl(p̄+ m̄τ ; θi, l)dF
∗
θ (θi) = 0
In words, deadweight loss from the proposed distribution is at least as great as
the deadweight loss from any binary distribution that also rationalizes aggregate
demand and with the true distribution of preference types. From the first part
of the proof, any distribution that rationalized aggregate demand and had the
support of perceived prices contained in ∂dP yielded deadweight loss no greater
than what one could obtain with a binary distribution that rationalized aggregate
demand with Fθ = F
∗
θ . Theorem 2 noted that any distribution that rationalized
aggregate demand with Fθ = F
∗
θ yielded deadweight loss no greater than that
one could obtain with a distribution that had the support of perceived prices
contained in ∂dP , rationalized aggregate demand, and had Fθ = F ∗θ . Therefore,
any distribution that rationalizes aggregate demand and with Fθ = F
∗
θ yields
deadweight loss no greater than the proposed distribution.
B.2. Details on Application of Linear Model
We use data gathered by CLK (2009) on the aggregate consumption of beer in
U.S. states between 1970 and 2003, and cross-sectional data gathered by Goldin
and Homonoff (2013) on tobacco consumption between 1984 and 2000. We trans-
late their two models (in logs) to our linear specification. In particular, we are
interested in estimating models like the one in equation 2.8.
In the case of aggregate beer consumption, we follow CLK (2009) in using a
specification in first differences, and so we estimate regressions of the type:




st + γXst + εst
where yst represents per-capita consumption of beer, in gallons, for state s at time
t, τ e represents excise taxes on beer (included in sticker price), τ s represents sales
taxes (non-salient), X is a vector of controls, and ε is an i.i.d. error term. All
taxes are expressed in dollar amounts.
For each linear specification, we compute m̂ = β̃
β
, which gives us the ratio of
upper bound of deadweight loss to lower bound of deadweight loss (assuming that
maximal attention, m̄ = 1). Results are presented in table B.1. We also estimate a
number of other specifications, again following CLK (2009), presented in table B.2.
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These are meant to address concerns for spurious results – in particular, it could
be the case that consumers react differently to the two tax rates because while
sales taxes affect a variety of goods, excise taxes on beer affect only beer prices.
The second last column of table B.2 shows estimates for a regression only for those
states that exempt food (a likely substitute of beer) from sales tax, demonstrating
that even in this restricted sample beer consumption is quite insensitive to sales
tax. Finally, the last column addresses the potential concern that people might be
substituting toward other alcoholic beverages when they face a beer tax increase,
and not when they face a sales tax increase. As we can see, the share of ethanol
people consume in the form of beer is quite insensitive to either tax rate.
We repeat the exercise for Goldin and Homonoff (2013), who have a similar
set-up with individual-level, cross-sectional data on cigarette consumption. Even
though this is not aggregate data, estimating a linear model that only measures
average effects effectively leaves the analysis of section 2.4 unchanged. We again
follow the original authors of the paper when we estimate the equation:




st + γXst + δZist + εist
where now cist stands for tobacco consumption, in average cigarettes per day, for
individual i from state s in period t, τ e, τ s, and Xst should be interpreted as before,
and Zist is a vector of individual-level controls. All the details can be found in the
original paper. Results in table B.3 showcase a number of different specifications,
including several sets of fixed-effects, all following Goldin and Homonoff (2013).
Baseline Business cycle Alcohol regulations Region trends
∆(excise tax) -0.966 -0.875 -0.808 -0.715
(0.4) (0.393) (0.394) (0.394)
∆(sales tax) -0.305 -0.113 -0.114 -0.241
(0.708) (0.698) (0.699) (.7)
∆(population) -0.0002 -.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
∆(income per cap.) 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002
(0.00006) (0.00006) (0.00006)
∆(unemployment) -.094 -0.093 -0.093
(.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Alcohol reg. controls X X
Year FE X X X X
Region FE X
m̂ 0.316 0.129 0.141 0.338
(0.743) (0.8) (0.866) (0.996)
Sample size 1,607 1,487 1,487 1,487
Table (B.1) Estimating m̂ with several sets of controls, following the specifications in CLK
(2009) in the context of a linear model. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Policy IV 3-Year differences Food exempt Dep. var.: share of
for excise tax ethanol from beer
∆(excise tax) -0.808 -2.092 -1.114 0.036
(0.395) (0.897) (1.174) (0.006)
∆(sales tax) -0.114 -0.131 -0.449 0.018
(0.699) (0.826) (0.757) (0.011)
∆(population) -0.0001 -0.002 -0.00007 0.0000
(0.0002) (0.002) (.0002) (0.0000)
∆(income per cap.) 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0000
(.00006) (0.00007) (0.00007) (0.0000)
∆(unemployment) -0.094 -0.03 -0.056 -0.0001
(.026) (0.028) (.032) (0.0004)
Alcohol reg. controls X X X X
Year FE X X X X
m̂ 0.141 0.062 .403
(0.866) (0.395) (0.819)
Sample size 1,487 1,389 937 1,487
Table (B.2) Estimating m̂ following the strategy of CLK (2009) in the context of a linear model.
As in CLK, we use the nominal excise tax rate divided by the average price of a case of beer from
1970 to 2003 as an IV for excise tax to eliminate tax-rate variation coming from inflation erosion.
Next, we run the same regression in 3-year differences. Next, we run it only for states where
food is exempt from sales-tax, to address concerns about whether consumers react differently to
changes in the two taxes only because sales taxes apply to a broad set of goods. Finally, the
last column addresses the concern that beer taxes may induce substitution with other alcoholic
products, biasing the coefficient on excise tax relative to the one on sales tax. While in the
log-log specification of CLK (2009) it seems to show that beer excise taxes have no discernable
effect on the share of ethanol consumed from beer, we do find a significant effect. Standard errors
in parentheses.
Outcome variable: Number of cigarettes
Specification 1 2 3
Excise Tax -0.015 -0.015 -0.016
(.004) (.004) (.004)
Sales Tax -0.024 -0.02 -0.022
(0.022) (0.025) (0.025)
Demographic controls X X X
Econ. conditions controls X X
Income trend controls X
State,year, and month FE X X X
m̂ 1.57 1.33 1.37
(1.65) (1.83) (1.82)
Sample size 274,138 274,138 274,138
Table (B.3) Estimating m̂ based on the intensive response of cigarette consumption to sales
taxes (not included in sticker price) and excise taxes (included in the sticker price). The speci-




Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1. Adjustment Costs Example
For simplicity, we consider a tax on revenue in this section. An investment x
yields return εf(x), where f(x) = 2
√
x. Suppose that with probability one ε = 1.
In addition, τ = 1
2
with probability one. Then the firm optimally sets x = 1
2
.
It never needs to adjust investments thereafter because τ and ε are known with
probability one.
However, suppose instead that with probability p it turns out that ε = 1/p,
and with probability 1 − p it turns out that ε = 0. In addition, we let τ = 1 if
ε = 0, while τ = 0 otherwise. Thus, there is now a negative covariance between τ
and ε, whereas before there was no covariance. Finally, after the realizations of τ
and ε, there is a fixed cost F of adjusting capital.
In this new hypothetical, so long as p < 0.5, the firm will never choose x =
(1/p)2. That option is dominated by x = 0, as this option makes the likelihood
of adjusting and paying the fixed adjustment cost F not as likely. The other
possibility is that the firm chooses x = 1 and does not adjust at all.1 The firm’s
expected profit from the strategy of not adjusting is 1, whereas the expected
profit from choosing x = 0 and adjusting to (1/p)2 if ε = 1/p is (1/p)2 − F . So
long as p < min{ 1
F+1
, 0.5}, the firm optimizes by choosing x = 0. Thus, with
adjustment costs, decreasing the covariance between taxes and productivity can
decrease investment.
C.2. Data Appendix
In this section we provide details about the data used in our empirical analysis.
Figures C.1, C.2, and C.3 plot the evolution of our main measures of policy un-
certainty over the respective sample periods. Table C.1 refers summary statistics
about the two samples underlying the naked CAPM and the Fama-French CAPM
models estimated in our empirical analysis. Table C.2 shows correlations between
our different measures of policy uncertainty.





Figure (C.1) Economic Policy Uncertainty Index from Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016).
Figure (C.2) Google search interest in “oil drilling”.
Figure (C.3) Google search interest in “healthcare”.
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Naked Fama-French
Number of firms 690 556
Number of periods 360 120
Market value 7310.31 8442.63





Consumer disc 0.125 0.128






Real Estate 0.036 0.040
Table (C.1) Summary Statistics for the two samples corresponding to the two specifications of
interest.
oil drilling healthcare EPU
oil drilling 1.000
healthcare −0.2672 1.000
EPU −0.0623 0.2336 1.000
Table (C.2) Correlations between measures of policy uncertainty.
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